Cliopatria: Swift Boat Historiography

Jonathan Dresner has a great posting over at Cliopatria on how interesting it would be to think about the Swift Boat issue from the perspective of historiography.

Historiographically, how would we balance contemporary documents against decades-removed oral history, if it were not a partisan issue? When is absolute certainty justified in the face of contradictory sources? What bigger questions does this connect to (i.e., is this really an avenue worth pursuing) or are there analyses that need to precede asking the questions we’re asking?

He concludes by asking how close historians need to get to the “truth” of history.

Do we, as historians, really need to answer these questions, or is it enough to note the “interesting” vagaries of sources and leave it at that?

This kind of question is one that also deeply troubles me, just as I am about to begin a PhD program in history. I hope Dresner will have more words of wisdom on this in his future postings. My feeling right now is that how “vague” we leave contested moments that find their way into our narratives will depend ultimately on the questions we posed in our work. For example, the Swift Boat veterans, and those who seek to reveal their contradictions at least both seem to agree that the questions are “Was Kerry a liar?” Or more broadly, “Is he ‘unfit for command.'”

The shift of public debate to this kind of question marks a significant “historiographical” coup for supporters of the Bush campaign insofar as Kerry’s military record was previously approached with questions like, “How much does his military service make him a better presidential candidate to lead a country at ‘war'” or at worst, “Does Kerry’s activism following his service in Vietnam show a profound disrespect for America’s men and women in uniform?” While I personally find all these questions completely uninteresting, it is easy to see how the latter two allow a historian or commentator of any flavor to leave the vagaries of his months of service alone. Jonathan Dresner really brings up some important issues in postings like this one but to his, “Do we, as historians really need to answer these questions?” I would add one more query, “Do we, as historians really need to ask these questions?”

Kodomo no Kuni Website

I found a link on Blogdex I thought I’d pass on. It is a site dedicated to Artists and Children’s Books in 1920s Japan, and in particular, the journal コドモノクニ (“The Land of Children”). The materials are prepared by the International Library of Children’s Literature which is a beautiful library connected to the National Diet Library found just behind Ueno Park in Tokyo.

I think the Kodomo no Kuni website is a good example of the kind of history project I hope to become very popular in the future: pick something manageable in scope, put a lot of materials not available online into a format easily viewable online with a pleasant and accessible design. Provide some introductory narrative and some primary materials. While this site doesn’t provide it, I think it would also be good to provide: a more extensive index and database of materials not included for display in the main presentation of the site but can be viewed by those who are interested in seeing more (like the Columbia University Ling Lung women’s magazine project which in contrast, lacks the presentation of the Kodomo no Kuni site), links to more information, the ability to easily download materials for offline viewing, a place for users to post comments and new info, and some kind of updates or an RSS feed for newly added material. I have a few of these kind of small projects in mind and will post more when I get something going on them.

New DPRK related documents

There is a great collection of Cold War related docs at Woodrow Wilson Cold War International History Project. There is a really interesting collection of articles and (and in many cases newly discovered) primary documents related to the DPRK. (Thanks to Budaechigae for this awesome link) Incidentally, I am not really comfortable with many of the Korea related blogs around which constantly refer to the DPRK as the “norks.” I don’t know anything about the origin of the term but it has a similar ring to “japs”, “chinks”, and “gooks” etc. It is interesting to note that I haven’t seen any of them refer to the South Koreans as “soks” so I think there is a good possibility they are engaging in a kind of classic dehumanizing objectification of a perceived enemy. I hope they might consider using “DPRK” or even “N.K.” or something if they want an easy abbreviation for North Korea.

Japanese Migration to China

A few weeks ago I attended a fascinating talk at Waseda by Emer O’Dwyer, one of my 先輩 (seniors) also studying under Andrew Gordon at Harvard. She has been very helpful in giving me advice on the PhD program, and I was impressed by her recent talk. She presented her research on “Emigration, Settlement, and Economic Competition: Japanese and Chinese Experiences in Dairen, 1905-1927″. As her title suggests, she talked about both Japanese and Chinese moving into Dalian 大连 (Dairen is the Japanese pronunciation), a city on the Liaodong 辽东 peninsula in northern China, and she focused primarily on a period when there were significant changes in the demographics of the city as the Chinese population grew rapidly and Chinese businesses began to displace those of the Japanese.

The most important discovery I think Emer made was when she explored the Japanese reaction to the increasing dominance of the Chinese in the local market. I would have expected the usual anti-Chinese ethnic slurs and insults. Instead, she found in the many journals and other writings of the period a fascinating phenomenon: the Japanese were deeply impressed by the Chinese laborers and used the Chinese as a model to follow in correcting their own “lazy”,”decadent”, and “inefficient” ways. They even saw Chinese clothes as more simple and economical, while their own was “irrational” and “not modern” in comparison.

Some time after I heard Emer’s talk about emigration to Dalian, I saw an advertisement for the most recent issue of the Asahi weekly AERA (No. 32) which had its focus on 日本人「職の中国」へ大移動」 (Massive migration of Japanese to the “middle kingdom of work”). The main article focuses on Japanese labor migration to Dalian. A closer look at the numbers shows that the migration isn’t exactly “massive” but still has some very interesting features…
Continue reading Japanese Migration to China

Karen Wigen: Creating the Modern Japanese Alps

Karen Wigen, a scholar of historical geography at Stanford, gave a fascinating talk last night at Keio University on “Moving Mountains: Creating the Modern Japanese Alps” She looked at the “discovery” of the Japanese Alps (a term given to three chains of mountains in Japan by an Englishman) in the Meiji period by metropolitan and usually elite alpinists (Japanese and foreigners). She describes the new sense of place that resulted, how this got embedded in local/regional conceptions of space, and the transition from the traditional Japanese worship of famous places (名所, places which get their fame from a literary or religious connection)to a more modern appreciation of scenery and landscapes for their beauty and remoteness (風景)in the practice of mountaineering. She at modern mountaineering and nature tourism (as distinct from traditional religious pilgrimages and pre-modern travel), which is a fusion of romanticism and science that often had the (ironic) goal of escaping the modern. She locates the roots of Japanese alpinism both in European Romanticism and East Asian landscape painting. I record just a few of her ideas here that I found interesting.
Continue reading Karen Wigen: Creating the Modern Japanese Alps

Freedom and Equality

Sometimes it is good to come across reminders that words, while powerful, and potentially imbued with virtuous sounding echos, can often hide deeply compromising realities. Take the passage below, for example, found in the testimony at the trial of a Japanese popular rights activist who was planning a Japan led/guided revolution in Korea. I have removed the words “Korea” and “Asia” and “Japan” and “Japanese” etc. and replace with “we” and “they” etc. in order to show the template that lies beneath. As a fun experiment try replacing these words with other countries from the last year of news:

“[We] wish to bring peace and happiness to the people suffering there…Our action is derived from compassion, a spirit of mutual help; it was not aimed at war with the people….[They] are our brothers and sisters. Just as they may offer help to [us] [we] too must be ready to help them. There should be no suspicion of one who sees another people suffering, feels compassion toward them and wishes to help them. It is the person who does not respond that way that should be suspected. [Their] customs are…uncivilized…and [their] penal codes are barbaric….For [us] to just watch and do nothing for them was unbearable to those of us who love freedom and equality, and our mind was made up to help them…Our struggle in [that country] is not a war in the usual sense; it is directed not against the country itself nor against its people but against a handful of leaders there who are oppressing the people….” (14)

While the plot failed, Japan went on to annex Korea only a few decades later. The quote is cited in an old essay by Etô Shinkichi, “Two Faces of Janus: The Role of Japanese Activists in Modern East Asia” from 1986. As I indicated in my earlier posting on the Norwegian SS soldier, I’m increasingly fascinated by how easily accounts from what we may imagine to be diametrically opposed ideologies or distant historical contexts can often sound so similar when we merely remove a few nouns here and there.

I haven’t thought this through yet, but I don’t think it is possible or even desirable to completely desensitize ourselves to powerful rhetoric, or extract some pure rational argument supporting every cause both noble and wicked. Given that, how do we situate ourselves in a world buzzing with these kinds of messages? It is a real issue for me, and one that I find myself thinking about a lot…

Inventions, National Achievements, and Paper clips

Most nations of the world go out of their way to celebrate things they have, or believe they have, contributed to the world. They often latch onto the creations or achievements of a person or a whole community of a period when there was nothing similar in form to the modern nation. Sometimes the “achievements” claimed or celebrated, are, upon closer examination, responsible for so much mischief, that one wonders why they are still celebrated. Mongolia’s fascination with the figure of Genghis Khan is a good example of both. This sort of practice is so common I think we can all think of examples in every country.

When these achievements are of a more abstract or ideological nature, even the most admirable of principles can lead to sinister consequences. The most obnoxious obvious example I can think of is the American claim to be the world’s wellspring of freedom and democracy. The claim takes many forms, from the limited celebration of the entrance of America’s democracy onto the world stage, to a broader vision of America as being somehow uniquely capable of blessing the world with leadership and guidance. What I think is unique about this kind of nationalist claim is its powerful universal reach. That is, it goes beyond the traditional nationalist claim of, “Hey, my nation has a glorious history and kicks major butt” to reach beyond its borders and suggest there is a national responsibility to attend to the development of the rest of the world.

While America has gone through several “isolationist” periods, I don’t think this built-in aspect of American nationalism has ever disappeared completely. I also know that I’m not the first to argue that this is a feature America shares with Napoleon’s France and the Soviet proletarian revolution. It probably also shares much in common with another move, less particular to any single nation as it is a feature of the birth and development of nations in general (especially the colonial powers): the claim to champion progress and Civilization. All of these moves serve as a powerful justification for Empire, mass mobilization, and total war when they are effectively deployed.

Most nations like Norway, however, appear to be content to take pride in the invention of more mundane things. Of course, Norwegian-Americans can often be found with bumper stickers or mugs claiming, “Columbus had a Norwegian map,” which is a joking reference to the viking settlements in North America that long preceded Christopher’s trip across the ocean. However, I am told now that someone is making the more serious claim that Columbus had a Chinese map. Oh well. At least Norway invented paper clips.

I read this first in a fascinating book I skimmed through some years ago at a friend’s house in Stavanger. It was kind of a picture book of “Norwegian inventions.” Each page had a beautiful picture of some object that “Norway invented” and on the facing side was a short history of that particular object. Ferro-concrete and rubber boots were two of the book’s more memorable entries and probably not as controversial as the Norwegian claim to have invented skiing. But paper clips—how could I ever view these humble metal objects in the same way again? How can I avoid being filled with national pride at the way my dear humble Norway revolutionized the modern office environment at the turn of this century?

What is most farcical about this class of more modest claims, of course, is the way that an individual’s invention is transformed suddenly into the pride of a whole nation. Presumably, the inventiveness of the individual is a reflection of national character, intelligence, or the quality of its educational system. Fortunately, discussion of these national inventions and achievements now often retain only a sort of cocktail party trivia value. I wish I could say that this was always the case. Exceptions abound.

Many Chinese, and the Chinese government, for example, are rather unsure of how they are to respond to the achievements of overseas Chinese who make dazzling scientific discoveries, or when one of the most eloquent critics of their authoritarian government wins a nobel price for literature. Do you claim them for national pride? Ignore them? Or do you perhaps condemn them as traitors if they don’t come home? The Americans, of course, will claim for their own anyone who did research at its powerful universities and other institutes.

Another way that this becomes a big issue is when something like a Nobel prize becomes government currency to legitimize an education system or measure its degree of “creativity.” Japan’s Ministry of Education and many of Japan’s politicians are convinced that winning a certain number of nobel prizes is a great way to advance Japan’s reputation globally, as well as measure the progress of its educational reform. James Bartholomew has done a lot of research on this for those who are interested in learning more. Japan has announced the goal of winning 30 prizes over the next 50 years. One of many problems is, as Bartholomew pointed out in a presentation I saw him give at Berkeley a few years ago, the Nobel prize system has never been anything close to a fair and objective measure of scientific achievement (it was also structurally tilted in favor of Scandinavians at one point). He talked about Japan’s efforts to win science prizes in the prewar period and the amazing obstacles they faced in competing (as well as domestic discord which often sabotaged their chances). The Nobel prize process is one so mired in politics that the Japanese government has poured all sorts of money into coordinating its efforts nationally and playing the political lobbying campaign (see one interesting article here) that I seriously doubt that any eventual success of the policy can be linked to a general flowering of Japanese creativity and scientific prowess.

bindersNow Norwegian paper clips, on the other hand—there is an achievement which can tell you a lot about that people in the cold north. The invention of paper clips doesn’t prove that Norwegians are necessarily more creative or even great scientists. It means, like the Norwegian word for paper clip, binders, itself means: the people of the Norwegian nation are bound together as one. This is best demonstrated by the fact (you can read one online retelling of this here, and on countless Norwegian web sites—the web never lies) that during the German occupation of Norway, Norwegians were forbidden to wear badges bearing the initials of their exiled king so instead they displayed their national unity by attaching paper clips to their clothes.

Tale of a Norwegian Soldier

On April 9, 1940, Norway’s neutrality came to an end when German naval forces launched their attack. In less than 24 hours, Narvik, Egersund, Arendal, Trondheim, Bergen, and my hometown of Stavanger had all been occupied. Oslo and the rest of the country were quickly taken. The king and the rest of the government retreated northwards as they resisted the German advance, but both abandoned the country on June 7th and set up a government in exile. By mid-June organized resistance was squashed and Germany ruled Norway relatively quietly until the end of the war. Perhaps the only major upset was the fact that, unlike their occupation of Denmark, they were unable to take Oslo in time to capture the king and legally elected government, which they had hoped would continue ruling during the occupation. Instead, they fled and the exiled government officially joined the allied cause.

In my family, mom is the expert on Norway’s experience of World War II, or at least that part of it fought on the oceans. She has a massive website dedicated to Norway’s war at sea and my grandfather’s part in it. The vast majority of Norway’s merchant marine joined together to form the world’s largest shipping company, Nortraship, and would become a vital support line supplying the Allies throughout the war. Some 30,000 Norwegian sailors participated and almost 4000 sailors lost their lives (see some stats on my mom’s site here and here).

I’ll let mom handle the ships and some of the untold stories of their many sailors. Today’s post is but to mention the tale of one Norwegian soldier, a Sverre Ryen from Sel in Gudbrandsdalen, which I found retold by Karsten Alnæs in his Historien om Norge volume four, En Ny Arbeidsdag (Gyldendal 1999). I have a particular interest in his case, and those like it all over the world during his time. Below I translate a few of Sverre’s own words, admittedly stripped of their context, in order, I hope, to reveal a certain element of continuity between this soldier’s experience and those of millions of others like him.
Continue reading Tale of a Norwegian Soldier

Ralph Luker on In Denial

Ralph Luker has a posting at Cliopatria on the book In Denial: Historians, Communism & Espionage.

I have a deep interest in arguments like the one put forward in the book Luker is discussing, which along with Coulter’s Treason, some recent criticism of Kerry’s opposition to Vietnam, and a long history of criticism of the left is something I think we can broadly define as “collaborationist critique” (I think I just made this term up). Yes, I am aware of the fact that, in one sentence, I have mixed a history book, a crazy polemicist’s ramblings, and political attacks on a candidate in election year. Collaborationist critique, or the branding of the left as traitors, anti-American, etc., especially through the focus on the connection between left wing Americans (and recently, Norwegian leftist politicians) and Communists, is an effective political attack in whatever form it may take. It is perhaps the most effective when it is wielded against academics, since the massive time and resources these intellectuals have personally put into their field makes it difficult to counter their scholarship directly without deploying your own researchers.

From my limited study so far, collaborationist critique comes in two often overlapping forms: the critique is generalized to make the claim that 1) the left is clearly lacking in “Patriotism” and is thus unfit to lead the nation, whose interests it will doubtlessly betray, and 2) the left is closely tied to international movements (Communism) or Evil men (Stalin) which are guilty of hideous crimes.
Continue reading Ralph Luker on In Denial

Chinese Character Reform Movements in Taiwan

Last Saturday (I’m getting caught up on lots of things I wanted to blog here about) the COE-CAS at Waseda, where I’m currently a research assistant, gave three of its graduate students one of many opportunities to present on their research in front of other students and professors connected to the center. While all three presenters were delivered some sharp words of advice on their work from the collection of big whig professors who attended, I learnt a lot from listening to the papers and comments that followed.

Of the three presentations I was most interested in a paper by Sugano Atsushi 菅野敦志 on the history of Chinese character reform movements in Taiwan entitled 台湾における「簡体字論争」ー国民党の「未完の文字改革」とその行方.

Anyone who has studied Chinese knows that there are two major sets of Chinese characters in common use. The simplified characters or 简体字 and the traditional or full-form characters 繁體字 or as they sometimes called, the 正體字 (the “correct” characters). The former are used in mainland China and more recently in Singapore, while the latter are used in Taiwan and other places with large Chinese populations. Many of the simplified characters are short hand versions of characters which all writers of Chinese characters use in some form or another when they write things by hand and there are variations of these in Japan, Korea, Taiwan, China and elsewhere. Mainland China has its own standard simplified set, and many complain about the sometimes less than satisfactory changes.

The characters have political importance too. After the Chinese civil war, the nationalist government under Chiang Kai-shek retreated to Taiwan and it would not have been easy for them to simply adopt the mainland Communist government’s set of simplified characters after they implemented their reform in the mid 50s. I have always thought that that was the end of the story, that is, the mainland Communist regime pointing to their characters as “progressive” and a contribution to increased literacy through simplification, while the Taiwanese, with their more complicated characters boasting that they alone preserve China’s written culture with its beautiful and semantically rich characters.

I won’t go into the details of Sugano’s paper here but essentially he talks about the fact that Taiwan’s nationalist government was at one point very serious about reforming the characters. He focuses on two reform movements, one in the mid 50s and a second one in the late 60s. In both cases, there was heated discussion amongst scholars, government committees, and also a lively involvement by Taiwan’s newspapers press, which I found surprising given the repressive controls on Taiwan’s media. Ultimately, both movements failed, and I fear Sugano doesn’t fully explain why, but throughout his paper he brings up some fascinating little tidbits about the debate.

One thing I found very surprising was that apparently Chiang Kai-shek was strongly for the simplification of the characters. In December of 1954 he is quoted as saying, “For the education and convenience of the masses, I believe that nation can greatly benefit from the introduction of simplified characters. I am for it, and believe we need to promote it.” (I hope my English translation of Sugano’s Japanese translation of the original Chinese is not too far from the original in meaning)

A second point he showed was how the debate over the reform of the characters sometimes pitted mainland 外省人 against native Taiwanese. The former had much to gain from the fact that they already had been raised on the old characters while the native Taiwanese, many of which were illiterate, would have nothing to lose from the reform. This doesn’t quite play out in the statistics however, as we can see below.

Sugano also notes that the two sides in the Taiwanese debate on reform were split completely in where they located the value of the characters themselves. The pro-simplification reformers always described Chinese characters as a “tool” of communication, and thus evaluated the need for reform based on a desire to increase literacy. The anti-reform side always argued that the characters were a symbol of Chinese traditional culture and thus needed to be preserved. Sugano’s puts this nicely, 「賛成派と反対派の「文字」に対する認識は始めから大きく異なるものであった...賛成派は、文字を「思想伝達の道具」であるとして捉え、一方の反対派は「民族伝統文化の象徴」であるの考えに立脚していた。」

Finally, he quotes a fascinating survey from the Taiwanese newspaper 聯合報 from April 1954 in which a solid majority of Taiwanese supported the reform movement, which collapsed shortly thereafter. The numbers he cites are as follows: 7315 for character reform (2888 native Taiwanese and 4389 mainlanders) and 4807 against (1178 native Taiwanese and 3610 mainlanders) or 41.8% for simplification vs. 30.2%.

Update: After being mentioned on the excellent Language Hat blog, Joel at Far Outliers added another part of the story of character reform which was featured in a recent New Yorker article. The article argues that Stalin played a key role in advising Mao against taking the final step to romanization.

Update: Kerim over at Keywords has commented on the literacy rates in Taiwan and also posted an entry which contains more information and some very interesting looking interests. I am so happy to see this kind of conversation between blogs starting to happen her as well. Thanks Kerim!