

The Persistence of Transnational Idealism in Early Postwar Japan, 1945-1949

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Some Objectionable Propaganda

In May, 1946 the inaugural issue of an obscure Ibaraki prefecture magazine *Taiwa Shinron* (New Thesis of the Great Peace) announced the goals of its new publication with an article entitled “Abandon War! In Order to Establish World Peace.” It had been less than a year since Japan had surrendered to Allied forces. The General Assembly of the new United Nations had met for the first time just a few months earlier on January 10, and a draft of Japan’s new constitution, eventually promulgated in November, had been unveiled to the public only two months earlier on March 6.

Before celebrating Japan’s abandonment of war in the draft constitution, proclaiming support for the United Nations, and discussing the need to establish a new, “moral order based on coexistence and co-prosperity [共存共栄]” the magazine’s editor, Matsunobu Kitarō (松延其太郎) explains the title of the magazine:

Today [is] the second creation of Japan. We must become 8,000,000 gods and bring to realization the ideal of an exalted and beautiful state. And moreover, this must not stop at just the reconstruction of Japan. The nations of all the world, in other words, the entire world must unite in the supreme aim of our notion that is [read as] TAIWA [世界の各国家が即ち全世界が国家最高の目的に帰一する其最高目的とは即ち大和の大道に帰一することである].¹

This passage failed to pass the inspection of the SCAP occupation authority’s Civil Censorship Detachment (CCD). The examiner’s notes gives us an explanation:

Ex’s Notes – Above objectionable propaganda. External meaning of world peace ok, but TAIWA has a double meaning – “Great Peace”, and when read Yamato, “Japan”. Particularly since the magazine is called TAIWA SHINRON and its nature is reactionary, the clever use of this as propaganda deserves attention. (Quotation DISAPPROVED – propaganda)²

¹ Matsunobu Kitarō “Sensō wo suteyo, sekai heiwa kakuritsu no tame ni” *Taiwa Shinron* 1 (5/15/1946):1 [ZZ10 T60]. Because I am here discussing the interpretation of the CCD authorities, this passage is *not* my own translation but that of CCD with minor corrections for grammatical mistakes. All articles cited below that are found in the Gordon W. Prange collection are indicated by location numbers. They are all from the archive’s Magazine Collection and can be located with the magazine classification number (ZZ10) and the code number for the magazine itself (T60). General information about the collection can be found at the collection’s homepage <http://www.lib.umd.edu/prange/index.jsp> and a free article index database is available for search to registered members at the “Senryōki zasshi kiji jōhō dêtabêsu” located at <http://www.prangedb.jp/>.

² Censorship Documents attached to *Taiwa Shinron* 1 (5/15/1946) [ZZ10 T60]

The compound being using to describe a great peace, *taiwa* [大和] is most commonly read as *yamato*, referring to Japan. Indeed, with the exception of one name of a town in central Miyagi prefecture, there are no entries in any major Japanese dictionary that lists *taiwa* as the pronunciation of this compound on its own.³ And yet, beginning with the second issue and in every issue thereafter, any ambiguity surrounding the pronunciation of the two characters was removed by adding the Romanization of the publication's title on the cover next to its Japanese equivalent: "TAIWA—SHINRON"

Since the explanation quoted above was banned by the censors, however, the first issue is left without any explanation of the "reactionary" magazine's interesting title, and its readers had to guess for themselves what the title is all about as they go on to read the next article which argued that women's involvement in politics is crucial for the country's reconstruction.⁴ Over two hundred articles from the magazine, covering the years 1946-1949 can be found, along with censorship documents, in the Gordon W. Prange collection, and their contents range from praise for land reform and democratization to local news from Ishioka and articles on developments in agriculture.

In addition to adding a Romanization of the title, the second issue of the publication makes one more major adjustment by changing its motto, printed next to the header of each issue, from "Our principle is to support Great Peace for eternity" (吾が主張は萬世の大和なり) to "Harmony is a most precious thing" (和を以て貴しとなす), thus removing the only other major reference to *taiwa* besides the publication's name. Somewhat ironically, however, the new motto invokes an even more powerful link to

³ "daiwa" on the other hand is frequently found in names (such as the Daiwa bank).

⁴ *ibid.*, "Nihon sai shuppatsu no jōken: fujin san seiken no igi jūdai nari" Although, I use the word "magazine" the format of the publication changes shape and form between issues, at times resembling a newspaper, a short pamphlet, or a magazine.

Japan's past. The phrase is taken from the opening line of Prince Shōtoku's famous Seventeen-Article Constitution from the early 7th century, the third article of which begins with, "When you receive the imperial commands, fail not scrupulously to obey them."⁵ Wartime booklets issued by the Ministry of Education go into great detail on how exactly this harmony, or *wa*, is to be achieved, for example, through a "self-negating devotion" to one's superior.⁶

The censors failed to notice this reference or, for some reason, did not find it as problematic as the "clever" use of *taiwa* in the opening issue. Nor did censors find objectionable the name of a similarly entitled magazine *Daiwa*, which uses the same two characters. The only way this second more moderate magazine dedicated to politics, economics, and literature resembles *Taiwa Shinron* is when it justifies its choice of title to show its high regard for "peace, that is, *great peace* [大和]."⁷ This is in stark contrast to the handling of a third publication of genuinely nationalist credentials, *Yamato Damashii* [大和魂], a small Hokkaido literary magazine filled with poems dedicated to the Japanese emperor. The magazine's few issues are heavily censored and suspected by some examiners of being in league with other nationalist organizations and publications.⁸

Censorship examiners continued to censor *Taiwa Shinron* in later issues however, despite increasing evidence that it had anything but "reactionary" content. The magazine uses the vocabulary and symbols of wartime Japan not only to advocate world

⁵ Ian Reader, Esben Andreasen & Finn Stefánsson *Japanese Religions Past & Present* (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1993), 167.

⁶ Fujiko Isono "Post-surrender democratization of Japan – was it a revolution?" in Ian Neary *War, Revolution & Japan* (London: Routledge, 1995), 109.

⁷ "Sōkan no ji" *Daiwa* 1.1 (2/28/1947): 2 [ZW01 D66] Emphasis in original. The pronunciation of the title is confirmed in the Romanization of the title on the magazine's back cover.

⁸ See censorship documents attached to *Daiwakon* [ZZ10 D67]. Note how the title is Romanized in SCAP records, in later issues, an examiner writes the more likely reading "Yamato Damashii" over the original Romanization and it is referred to by this name intermittently. Examiners are confused by the origins of the magazine and one examiner (labeled as B. Inomata) suspects the whole magazine, submitted in handwritten manuscript, is published "by some senior middle school boys secretly gathered together." See censorship documents attached to the June, 1947 issue.

peace, but to buttress a strong editorial policy supporting world federalism. In a September 1948 article on “The Establishment of a World Government” we find the following passage, again by Matsunobu:

There is no goal more important than to build a peaceful world without war and human conflict, that is, the world must become as one family [世界一家]. It is exactly this philosophy of the world as one family that emperor Jinmu was proclaiming when, on ascending the throne, he issued an imperial rescript which put all of mankind together, united the world as one family [天下一家], and made a roof [宇] to cover the eight corners of the world [八紘].⁹

Only after pre-publication censorship ended in the summer of 1948 and a more focused post-publication censorship took over could an author be confident that a passage like this would make its way to the Ibaraki reader.¹⁰ The passage almost exactly reproduces the slogan of “the eight corners of the world under one roof” [*hakkō ichiu* 八紘一字] found in plans for establishing the Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere and appearing frequently in wartime publications.¹¹ Just as Nishida Kitarō [西田幾多郎] (1870-1945) tried to rehabilitate the term *hakkō ichiu* in his weak critique of the Japanese military’s “ethnocentric egoism,” and use it to support a conception of global unity based on independent ethnic nations, here the term is invoked to support global unity and the eradication of war without any reference to preserving nations or ethnic identities at all.¹²

The same kind of language could not have been used at all a few years earlier, and the CCD was sensitive to anything which even resembled wartime ideology. The

⁹ Matsunobu Kitarō “Sekai seifu no juritsu: heiwa he no doryoku dai undō” *Taiwa Shinron* 29 (9/25/1948):1 [ZZ10 T60]

¹⁰ For a concise description of the CCD and the CIE (Civil Information and Education) sections and their activities during the occupation see Taketoshi Yamamoto (who manages the Prange collection’s online index) article Taketoshi Yamamoto “Senryōki no media tōsei to sengo nihon” *Kan* 22 (Summer 2005), 250-262. Actually, the process of moving from pre- to post-publication censorship had already started much earlier for some publications. For a more detailed analysis and chronology of this shift, including tables showing the gradual decline in military staff at the CCD, see Taketoshi Yamamoto *Senryōki media bunseki* (Tokyo: Hōsei daigaku shuppan kyoku, 1996), 299-303.

¹¹ William Theodore De Bary *Sources of Japanese Tradition* (New York, Columbia University Press, 1964 [1958]), 294-5. The phrase is also translated as “universal brotherhood” see W. G. Beasley *Japanese Imperialism 1894-1945* (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1987), 244.

¹² Michiko Yusa “Nishida and Totalitarianism” in *Rude Awakenings: Zen, the Kyoto School & the Question of Nationalism*. ed. James W. Heisig (Honolulu, University of Hawaii Press, 1995), 127.

censors, for example, took issue with a few poetic lines in the opening issue of *Taiwa Shinron* written by a far better known author, the aging parliamentarian Ozaki Yukio, entitled “The Whole World as One Family”:

[In t]his land of the Gods where now[,] because of the avarice of some, the people are starving and freezing and homeless.

The name nation sounds dignified and austere, but it has become a world smaller than a clan [藩].

Because clans were abolished and provinces established, our Land of Yamato became great.

If there are no clans, nor any nations, then the whole world would become as one house (family) and the people shall be prosperous.

This land of the Gods where world justice [天地正大] is the aspiration, has surrendered to those republics.¹³

Along with the translation of most of the poem, the examiner’s notes say, “Not the famous ‘Hakko Ichiu’ phrase, but a modern version of it. Not very good...(Poems DISAPPROVED – propaganda)”¹⁴

From this brief look at a small regional publication from Ibaraki prefecture and a few of the Allied censorship documents attached to it in the Prange archives one can make a number of observations which serve as an introduction to the central issues of consideration here. First, one finds in this curious little journal a strong internationalist tone. However, word “internationalist” is a somewhat problematic, as we shall see, since this is not the classic internationalism of Nitobe Inazo [新渡戸稲造] (1862-1933) and others who believed that “internationalism was based on the nation-state, and loyalty to the international community was compatible with loyalty to one’s nation.”¹⁵ Instead, there are a number of articles throughout the issues of this magazine committed to the

¹³ Translation is again taken, with minor modifications, from the Censorship documents attached to *Taiwa Shinron* 1 (5/15/1946) [ZZ10 T60]. Original poems on page 3 of the issue. I have not been able to determine when Ozaki’s poems were originally written or where it was initially published. The content suggests that it was written after Japan’s defeat. The obscure nature of *Taiwa Shinron* makes it unlikely that the poems were written for that publication.

¹⁴ *ibid.*

¹⁵ Tomoko Akami *Internationalizing the Pacific: The United States, Japan, and the Institute of Pacific Relations* (London: Routledge, 2001), 146.

complete dissolution of, or transcendence of the national community to form a political unit, if not an entire moral order on the global level. Like so many writings one can find in the early occupation period, *Taiwa Shinron* is filled with optimism for a new age of democracy, peace, and reform. However, it also embraces a transnational, or supra-national vision which we might believe to have been thoroughly discredited along with the wartime ideology proclaiming a pan-Asianist co-prosperity sphere under the tutelage of a benevolent Japanese empire.

Secondly, we see that the use of symbols and language to express such idealistic visions for the future are put under unique constraints in an occupied Japan where an elaborate Allied bureaucracy is dedicated to censoring any publications that are deemed too reactionary or radical in political leanings, or which critique any of the Allied nations. As we shall see, Ozaki Yukio would have plenty of opportunities to support world federalism and peace among peoples in other publications, but only by using language found appropriate to the occupation authorities. His poems found here in *Taiwa Shinron*, mixing the story of the unification of the “land of the Gods” with dreams of world unity were censored as being too close to the wartime “propaganda” of *hakkō ichiu*.

Embracing the World and Abandoning the Wartime Idiom

It is my primary contention that, far from being limited to rare and marginal publications such as *Taiwa Shinron*, there was a remarkable persistence of transnational visions to be found in early postwar Japan in a broad range of publications. Indeed, despite the urgent and immediate domestic needs of the people, many of whom, as Ozaki Yukio points out in his poem, were “starving and freezing and homeless” there was, from the start, a powerful optimism about the possibility for “world justice” and a global

community that would “become as one family.” Because such optimistic visions are almost without exception willing to contemplate strong limits on, if not the complete eradication of national sovereignty, I will generally refer to them as forms of *transnational idealism*. Their supporters, many of whom embraced and propagated Japan’s wartime ambitions for Asian unity, often go out of their way to distinguish themselves from supporters of the League of Nations or the postwar United Nations, even if they have in the past or will in the future come to terms with more imperfect conceptions of inter-national order.

The various pan-Asian visions of prewar and wartime Japan, based on conceptions of regional community or racial brotherhood do not survive unchanged in the postwar period. Censorship is an important factor to consider but the actual extent of its influence is far more difficult to measure and is not a primary focus of this study. Even in the case of *Taiwa Shinron*, however, one finds in both approved and censored material an intensified postwar emphasis on world peace, combined with transnational visions of world unity and poured into an older bottle of wartime symbols and language. Here, as elsewhere, there is a pronounced shift from a more limited emphasis on political union, economic interdependence, or cultural and spiritual solidarity with Asia, often justified with relatively sophisticated theories of shared Asian values and race—to a more simplistic, if not somewhat desperate demand for global government, united humanity, and the eternal peace it is believed to bring.

The only important exception to this shift from a focus on the regional to the global is the continued early postwar existence of the East Asia League Association [東亜連盟協会], led by Ishiwara Kanji [石原完爾] (1889-1949) until he was purged and the

organization banned in 1946.¹⁶ However, even in Ishiwara's case there were important changes that parallel the added sense of urgency that drives most early postwar transnational idealism. Ishiwara's conception of East Asian community was born out of his conviction that there would be a "final war" between the East and the West. In the early postwar period, his conviction that any war with nuclear weapons would result in the world's destruction together with an increasing turn to Nichiren religious thought led him to completely abandon the conception of a final war while keeping his ambitions for East Asian union.¹⁷ Before SCAP censors were even set up or any new constitution had been pronounced Ishiwara declared in his October, 1945 "The New Meaning of Abandoning War" that, "...we are now the eve of world unification and an age will come where war will completely vanish."¹⁸

There is no doubt that the experience of defeat, and perhaps more importantly, the overwhelming shock of being a victim of the world's first nuclear attack, have been accurately identified as crucial to the growth and vitality of Japan's postwar peace movements. One need go no further than to identify the huge range of new voices which eventually emerge to lead such movements. However, the story of postwar Japanese internationalism does not begin with efforts to enter the United Nations, support for the spirit of UNESCO, organized protests against nuclear weapons, the formation of the neutrality movement or with Japan's participation in the Bandung Conference of 1955. If anything, a closer look at the early postwar years reveals that the most optimistic and often radical support for various forms of transnational idealism are to be found in the

¹⁶ Mark Peattie R. *Ishiwara Kanji and Japan's Confrontation with the West* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1975), 350.

¹⁷ *ibid.*, 357.

¹⁸ Ishiwara Kanji "Sensō hōki no shin igi" in *Jinruigō shi e no suppatsu: Ishiwara Kanji sengō chosakushū* (Tokyo: Tenden sha, 1996), 80.

ashes of early occupation Japan, supported by familiar prewar and wartime leading intellectuals, and remaining strong until around the outbreak of the Korean War in 1950.

The transition from regional to global is important but it is profitable to interpret this shift within the broader continuities of transnational idealism across the dividing line of defeat in 1945. Asia and the cultural unity that it implies are not so much forgotten as they are transcended or overcome. If anything, it is the wartime symbols and language that express such ideas which rapidly disappears in the aftermath of war. To be clear: *Taiwa Shinron*, so representative in the spirit of its ambitions, is a lonely exception in its attempt to employ elements of a now discredited wartime idiom.

The Trouble with Internationalism

One approach to framing these highly optimistic ideas and ambitions of early postwar opinion leaders and intellectuals is to describe them as internationalist. Akira Iriye is comfortable using the term “internationalism” in opposition to “nationalism” and to describe both the most radical visions of global or regional political unity and more limited projects promoting international understanding within this broad theoretical category.¹⁹ Kevin Doak suggests, however, that we historicize this polar opposition of the two terms, for, “it was not always thus.”²⁰ Doak argues that the, “juxtaposition of nationalism with internationalism as opposite value systems was encouraged during the post-war years,” and is especially influenced by the work of Columbia University

¹⁹ Akira Iriye *Cultural Internationalism and World Order* (Baltimore: The John Hopkins University Press, 1997), 16. Chapter 1, “The Internationalist Imagination” demonstrates the sheer range of movements Iriye is considering.

²⁰ Kevin M. Doak “Liberal Internationalism in Imperial Japan” in Dick Stegewerns ed. *Nationalism and Internationalism in Imperial Japan: Autonomy, Asian brotherhood, or world citizenship?* (London: Routledge, 2003), 19.

professor Carlton Hayes (1882-1964), who argued that internationalism was merely the next stage of development beyond nationalism.²¹

While Hayes may indeed be one important voice contributing to the spread of this teleological claim, we cannot accept the idea that this was something new to the postwar period. It is hard to deny Iriye the use of internationalism as it was a term found used both in opposition to nationalism and as a highly flexible category, especially when critics of the nation-state and supporters of world government such as Gustave Hervé in his 1910 book *Internationalism* or Friedrich Naumann's conception of the "international idea" in his 1915 *Mitteleuropa* use the term in this way.²² Clearly, internationalism *can* be used in such a way as to include open critics of nations, nationalism, or those who believe that the nation is merely one step along a teleological progression.

However, as many scholars have pointed out, internationalism is frequently not in opposition to nationalism, nor does it necessarily entail any critique of the nation. This adds an element of unwelcome ambiguity in attempts to trace and evaluate movements with often very incompatible goals. Dick Stegewerns notes that the majority of participants in a February, 1921 debate in the pages of the Japanese publication *Chūō Kōron* entitled "A Critique of Nationalism versus Internationalism" deny any opposition between the two, and suggest that they are entirely compatible or as Doak notes, "mutually supportive."²³ We have already noted this for the case of Nitobe Inazō, and it

²¹ *ibid.*

²² Iriye *ibid.*, 23, 29.

²³ Dick Stegewerns "The Dilemma of Nationalism and Internationalism" in Dick Stegewerns ed. *Nationalism and Internationalism in Imperial Japan: Autonomy, Asian brotherhood, or world citizenship?* (London: Routledge, 2003), 6. One of the interesting exceptions to this is Sugimori Kōjirō's contribution, who is considered below. Stegewerns makes note of the highly diverse terms for internationalism used in the debate, but perhaps equally problematic are the diverse terms for nationalism, which contributes to the ease with which the participants could reject the validity of an opposing binary. For example, the "nationalism" in the title is "jikoku hon'ishugi" [自国本位主義] and each author must address its relationship to "kokka shugi" [国家主義]. See *Chūō Kōron* 36.2 (February, 1921), 39. Kevin Doak *ibid.*, 34.

generally holds true for liberal supporters of international cooperation in Japan outside the orbit of pan-Asianism and the wartime ideology of the “New Order.” Instead Stegewern suggests that the various terms related to internationalism in Japanese such as *kokusaishugi* [国際主義] contrast more sharply with the more radical “anti-internationalist” conceptions of globalism or *sekaishugi* [世界主義] and cosmopolitanism or *kosumoporitanizumu*.²⁴

Jessamyn Reich Abel’s work on wartime Japanese internationalism has already effectively argued that there exist, “important continuities in Japan’s relations with the world across the century.”²⁵ Although repeatedly emphasizing the “plural” and “flexible” nature of the term internationalism, and its constant redefinitions throughout modern Japanese history, Abel also distinguishes between internationalism, which is compatible with nationalism, the separate phenomenon of cosmopolitanism or universalism, and finally “imperialist visions of regional or global unity under a single hegemon.”²⁶ Since the “rhetoric of equality is central to internationalism” she employs the term “imperialist internationalism” to refer to Japan’s use of internationalist rhetoric in ideological justifications for empire.²⁷

The advantage to this approach is that it effectively demonstrates the continuities between earlier support for internationalism and the rhetoric of wartime. However, because it collapses the diverse theories and ambitions of Japanese intellectuals with wartime government policies, this state-ideology based approach reaches the familiar conclusion that, while many believed in the cause, the “rhetorical façade of

²⁴ Stegewerns *ibid.*, 13.

²⁵ Jessamyn Reich Abel, “Warring Internationalism: Multilateral Thinking in Japan 1933-1964” (PhD diss., Columbia University 2004), 7.

²⁶ *ibid.* 8-9

²⁷ *ibid.*

internationalism” was in fact quite “flimsy.”²⁸ When the aberration of wartime “imperialist internationalism” is abandoned, Japan returned to “plural internationalisms” eventually crystallizing into conservative “pro-American internationalists” and left-leaning pacifists.²⁹

Many intellectuals writing in the early postwar years, before the crystallizing effects of an increasingly Cold War set in, are regrettably difficult to categorize in this manner. Just as their prewar transnational idealism is found in diverse forms, their theories evolved when they were inevitably forced to negotiate between their own ambitions and desires to influence policy, the restricted range of options that might be expressed given the increasingly restricted political discourse, and the limits of their own ability to ignore the patent failures and contradictions in the realm of implementation.

The Trouble with Pan-Asianism

The pan-Asian visions of wartime Japan were anything but monolithic, though most share certain key features in common. The earlier generation of pan-Asianists such as Okakura Tenshin (Kakuzō) [岡倉天心] (1863-1913) and Kita Ikki [北一輝] (1883-1937) left an important legacy, especially in the case of Kita’s influential pan-Asianist theory tied to an ambitious program of socialist reform. The wartime policy pronouncements regarding the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperty Sphere or a Japan-led “New Order” in Asia were supported by a wide range of intellectuals and leaders who produced a great diversity of theories and visions about Asian brotherhood and political cooperation, and these figures continued to debate and develop their ideas throughout the turbulent years of the war.

²⁸ *ibid.*, 176.

²⁹ *ibid.*, 178-199.

The association promoting an East Asian League (also known as the East Asian Federation) [東亜連盟] led by Miyazaki Masayoshi [宮崎正義] and Ishiwara Kanji is an important example of a more organized non-governmental institution promoting the ideal of pan-Asian unity. The League was to consist of Japan, China, and Manchuria, with other regions to enter as “auxiliary members” in a relationship of economic mutual dependence.³⁰ The most basic function of the league was to be a united military policy of cooperative defense, initially for the purpose of eradicating Western imperialism.³¹ For a similar reason, since war is “waged on the basis of economic strength,” the economies of members were to be completely unified.³² Political independence and freedom in the realm of domestic laws, however, was to be guaranteed where these did not interfere with military and economic unity.³³

The spiritual and cultural element forms a more central component in some pan-Asian theories, which were often hazy on the details of how Asian unity would actually work in practice, leading their proponents to join one or several other existing organizations promoting more practical plans of action. Some pan-Asianists, like Nakayama Masaru [中山優], focused heavily on the desire to return to classic Confucian morality and a pure anti-modern past.³⁴ Ōkawa Shūmei [大川周明] (1886-1957) who is perhaps most famous for his temporary insanity at the postwar Tokyo war crimes trials than anything else, came to pan-Asianism through his strong interest in Islamic Studies

³⁰ Miyazaki Masayoshi *Tōa renmei ron* (Tokyo: Kaizōsha, 1938), 151.

³¹ *ibid.*, 152.

³² *ibid.*, 161.

³³ *ibid.*, 163-4. A brief summary of Miyazaki’s conception can be found in English translation in Joyce C. Lebra *Japan’s Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere in World War II: Selected Readings and Documents* (Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1975), 3-8.

³⁴ See J. Victor Koschmann “Asianism’s Ambivalent Legacy” in Peter J. Katzenstein and Takashi Shiraishi eds. *Network Power: Japan and Asia* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1997), 89-90. Like many pan-Asianists who eventually became involved in diverse organizations devoted to Asian unity, he joined Ishiwara Kanji’s East Asian League and the Greater Asia Association.

(he translated the *Koran* into Japanese) and an interest in India's independence movements. Ōkawa, who rediscovered a powerful nationalism relatively late in his life was primarily motivated by a desire to eject Western powers from its colonies. He believed that Japan's own domestic reform and renaissance would in turn serve as a model for Asia.³⁵ His strong connection to movements throughout Asia were continually mediated by his own nationalism and anti-imperialism. Ōkawa became heavily involved in military and nationalist organizations and like Kita Ikki, supported direct action and violence both at home and abroad. Only in this way did he believe he might achieve his aims of building a strong Japan which would lead a revitalized Asia, implement reform in China, and ultimately save humanity.³⁶

The members of the Shōwa Research Association [昭和研究会] cooperated closely with each other and Prime Minister Kono Fumimaro [近衛文麿] (1891-1945), who first announced the government's policy of establishing a New Order in Asia in 1938. They are sometimes portrayed as mouthpieces for Japanese wartime ideology. However, this did not prevent them from having differing and complex theories about Asian community. Miki Kiyoshi's [三木清] (1897-1945) and Rōyama Masamichi both underwent important changes in their position, which we cannot evaluate closely here, but one can get a flavor of the more radical nature of Miki's ambitions in a 1938 article, "The Foundation of East Asian Thought." The article was written the same year he was invited to form a new Cultural Problems Research Group [文化問題研究会] within the Shōwa Research

³⁵ See Ōtsuka Takehiro *Ōkawa Shūmei* (Tokyo: Chūkōshinsho, 1995), 128-136 and Bob Tadashi Wakabayashi ed. *Modern Japanese Thought* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 226-231.

³⁶ Ōtsuka *ibid.*, 178.

Association where he would urge intellectuals to share his deeply held conviction that the war in China had presented Japan and world history with in incredible opportunity.³⁷

...If we agree that in the world historical moment of today we cannot just simply stop at nationalism [民族主義], then total-ism [全体主義] [which first makes an appearance in the form of nationalism] must be expanded to an even greater totality such as an East Asian Community [東亜共同体] which transcends nationalism...Total-ism as it has existed to this point has the defect of suppressing the parts, and not recognizing the originality [独自性] and independence [自主性] of the individual. We must eradicate this from our new total-ism. As to the interiority of an East Asian Community, we must demand that Japan act from the position of its totality, but at the same time Japan must always maintain its own originality and independence, just as we demand that it accepts the originality and independence of China...East Asian thought is born out of a complete rejection of an abstract cosmopolitanism [世界主義] but in its particular nature is included the universal principle for a world order and must point the way to a new kind of cosmopolitanism...It overcomes the atomism of modern cosmopolitanism and thinks of the world as a true totality while preserving the originality of its parts...³⁸

Miki is surely the most abstract of the Shōwa Research Association's (SRA) intellectuals and the most perceptive analyst among them to consider the problems of universalism and particularism.

Fellow SRA member Rōyama Masamichi came from a background in international law and has much in common with earlier liberal internationalists. He supported the limited powers of the League of Nations, but on the eve of the Manchurian incident in 1931 came to support a system of regional agreements to preserve peace.³⁹ As Japan's international position deteriorated, he continued to argue against the creation of alternative international institutions to compete with the League, but by the time of the Sino-Japanese war began a slow transition from arguments based on politics and law to

³⁷ William Miles Fletcher *The Search for a New Order: Intellectuals and Fascism in Prewar Japan* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1982), 110-111

³⁸ Miki Kiyoshi "Tōyō shisō no konkō" *Kaizō* 20.12 (December, 1938), 16-17. For more of Miki's ideas of East Asian community, see Koschmann *ibid.*, 91-94. Also see Harry Harootunian *Overcome by Modernity* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000), 394-399. I use "total-ism" for *zentaishugi*, though Fletcher and the standard translation of the word is totalitarianism. Given the fact that Miki also became a fan of strong centralized state power, I feel it is important to distinguish this more abstract term from its political cousin.

³⁹ Kobayashi Hiroharu traces the development of Rōyama's theories of international order in Kobayashi Hiroharu "Rōyama Masamichi and the East Asian community" in Stegewerns *ibid.*, 136-167.

establishing a cultural and ideological direction for Japan's war.⁴⁰ His 1938-9 writings on East Asian Community shared with many other theories the desire to preserve a conception of ethnic nation while emphasizing "common destiny" and promoting development towards increased overall unification.⁴¹ By 1941 he had begun to connect his theories of East Asian regional unity with a world order which again preserved some form of ethnic nation but also allowed for the "external development of states that have arrived at the imperialist stage..."⁴²

Miki approaches the question of Asian unity at the most abstract philosophical level, while Rōyama approaches from a firmly grounded and generally pragmatic understanding of international law and politics. The SRA also had a number of Marxist thinkers for whom economic and class analysis was essential to any conception of regional order. These include Ryū Shintarō, Funayama Shin'ichi, and the revolutionary Marxist and convicted spy Ozaki Hotsumi [尾崎秀実] (1901-1944). Funayama connected his theory of a "new internationalism" [新国際主義], which has some echoes of both Miki and Rōyama's approach, to Hegelian theory and argued that the formation of a Greater East Asian economic and political block was only a step along the path to moving beyond a world of competing nations and regions and to achieving world unity.⁴³ Ozaki Hotsumi, on the other hand puzzled his collaborator, the fellow spy Richard Sorge when he became actively involved in supporting the creation of an East Asian community [東亜共同体].⁴⁴ Ozaki, who became interested in the "ethnic problem" [民族問題]

⁴⁰ *ibid.*, 153.

⁴¹ *ibid.*, 157.

⁴² Rōyama Masamichi "Sekai shinchitsujo no tenbō" *Tō-A to sekai: shinchitsujo e no ronsaku* (Tokyo: Kaizōsha, 1941), 49 translated and cited in Kobayashi *ibid.*, 160.

⁴³ See Abel *ibid.*, 137-139.

⁴⁴ Chalmers Johnson *An Instance of Treason: Ozaki Hotsumi and the Sorge Spy Ring* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1990), 119.

through his witnessing the implementation of Japan's colonial policies in Taiwan, the slaughter of Koreans in the great Kantō earthquake of 1923 and then later witnessing Chinese nationalism in China, believed that Japanese policies in Asia would hasten revolution there, and eventually trigger a revolution at home.⁴⁵

What all of these theories have in common is the conviction that, even if the ethnic nation is still important, the nation-state has either failed or will soon complete its term of usefulness as a level of political organization. It must, they believed, surrender some, most, if not all of its functions to a higher level of regional or global political community. Almost all of them retain a function for the ethnic nation within their new order, if not a strong emphasis on continued political independence, even as they strip it of military or economic autonomy. Some, like Rōyama, find that their respect for the independence of ethnic groups and opposition to assimilationist policies sits uneasily with their desire to maintain Japan's earlier imperial acquisitions.⁴⁶ They are often driven by anti-imperialist or anti-Western motivations but increasingly connect their theories of East Asian regional order to vague pronouncements of a future world order.

Although the cluster of ideas supporting these conceptions of a supra-national political community changed in the environment of postwar Japan, it did not disappear, only to reemerge, as some might argue, decades later in the rhetoric of a new Asianism. Conrad Totman is representative of the historiography when he writes,

Because the outcome proved so contrary to the ones envisioned by these academics, their musings quickly dropped from view, the written texts surviving today as embarrassments for some, but as precedents for reformist rhetoric by

⁴⁵ Yi Gyeongsoek "Ozaki Hotsumi no toa kyōdōtairon ni okeru minzoku to kakumei" Unpublished paper, 2004. Also see Stefan Tanaka *Japan's Orient: Rendering Pasts into History* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993), 223.

⁴⁶ Kobayashi *ibid.*, 158.

others, and as reminders for all of how marginal tendentious theorizing can be to the outcomes of life.⁴⁷

He is certainly right to claim that these philosophers and academics ultimately didn't change the outcome of the war but when the conflict ended, many figures supportive of an East Asian order not only refused to drop from view, but continued to publish actively and support ideas which share many of the assumptions of their wartime writings, with little if any embarrassment.

Early Postwar Intellectuals and the Publishing World

The end of the war brought no end to the hardships of wartime mobilization. A severe economic crisis, a feeling of exhaustion and despair captured by the word *kyodatsu* [虚脱] and especially food shortages would remain a central issue on the minds of the Japanese people in the initial years of the Allied occupation.⁴⁸ Hunger and widespread use of the black market continued through 1947 and 1948 while spiraling inflation continued throughout this period and into 1949.

Despite this there was a strong energy and excitement throughout the publishing world of the time. Keywords like “Democracy,” “Peace,” are to be found everywhere and to everything else, one can always attach the character for “new” [新]. My discussion below focuses primarily on the magazine and journal publishing world, which includes the popular *sōgō zasshi* [総合雑誌] “general” magazines that contain a wide range of materials directed at the general literate reader. The most important period for magazine publishing in postwar Japan begins in January, 1946, when five of the most

⁴⁷ Conrad Totman *History of Japan* (Oxford, Blackwell Publishing, 1999), 373.

⁴⁸ John W. Dower *Embracing Defeat: Japan in the Wake of World War II* (New York: W. W. Norton, 1999), 89. The term *kyodatsu* and *kyodatsu jōtai* [虚脱状態] are a common topic of discussion in magazines of the occupation, with the earliest article focusing on it coming as early as November, 1945, author unknown “Kyodatsu jōtai wo seisan seyo” *Keizai Shinshi* Vol. 2 issue 8 (November 1, 1945), 1 [ZD01 K830].

popular *sōgō zasshi* of the occupation period (See Chart #1) release their first postwar issues. The journals *Sekai* [“World” 世界], *Ningen* [“Humankind” 人間], and *Tenbō* [“Outlook/Horizon/Perspective” 展望] were new publications, while *Chūō Kōron* [“Central Review” 中央公論] and *Kaizō* [“Renovation” 改造] had a long pre-war history. The latter two, in particular, were host to most of the major debates related to nationalism, internationalism, and a new order in Japan.

It was in these journals that the leading postwar intellectuals, including Maruyama Masao, Hirano Ken, Ara Masato, Ōtsuka Hisao, Umemoto Katsumi, Shimizu Ikutarō, and Takeuchi Yoshimi, would write some of the articles that defined the major debates of the late 1940s and early 1950s. However, despite severe paper shortages there were thousands of other magazines published throughout Japan during this period, all of which were initially subject to censorship by the occupation authorities.

Surveys of early postwar Japanese thought such as those by Andrew Barshay and J. Victor Koschmann, focus on key issues of the first decade, including 1) Democratization and the debate over its revolutionary class-based or alternative modernist approaches, 2) Debates on individual ego, self-expression, and freedom, and especially the question of subjectivity or *shutaisei* [主体性], 3) A discourse of “repentance” and the “community of contrition” [*kaikon kyōdōtai* 悔恨共同体] 4) The problem of international peace (especially as debated by the members of the Peace Problems Symposium) but leading eventually to 5) The return of attention to nationalism or the *minzoku* [民族], and the rise of the national literature movement.⁴⁹

⁴⁹ See J. Victor Koschmann “Intellectuals and Politics” in Andrew Gordon ed. *Postwar Japan as History* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993), 396-403, Andrew Barshay “Postwar Social and Political Thought” in Bob Tadashi Wakabayashi ed. *Modern Japanese Thought* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 279-315. In J. Victor Koschmann *Revolution and Subjectivity* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996) Koschmann ties many of these various debates to his discussion of the *shutaisei* problem of subjectivity in early postwar Japan.

When it comes to the question of peace, however, the story often begins with a discussion of the 1948 publication of a statement on world peace in *Sekai*, the foundation of the Peace Problems Symposium or *heiwa mondai danwakai* [平和問題談話会] in the same year and its statements on world peace in 1949 and 1950.⁵⁰ In her work on grassroots pacifism in Japan, Mari Yamamoto points to the earliest major peace gathering, the Japanese Convention in Defense of Peace in 1949 as a starting point, albeit one which at the time was dominated by communist activists.⁵¹

Given the recent and traumatic experience of the war, the major publications of the early postwar period are, of course, filled with discussions about peace and its preservation from the beginning. As in the case of many future writings around the world on the subject, the terrifying prospect of future wars using nuclear weapons, even before the Soviet Union developed the weapon in 1949, led many to consider radical solutions for evading future international conflict. One such solution found a strong resurgence of interest in the early postwar period: world federalism.

World Federalism and the Return of the Universal

While supporters of wartime Pan-Asianism are particularly receptive to world federalism, the early postwar interest in world federalism has many prewar precedents in earlier theorists proposing various forms of supranational world government or inter-state federalism. Immanuel Kant, Kang Youwei (1858-1927), and H. G. Wells (1866-1946) are some of the more influential thinkers to have well-formed theories of this nature that were familiar to Japanese intellectuals. In a 1950 work on theories of world government,

⁵⁰ Koschman "Intellectuals and Politics" *ibid.*, 402. Barshay *ibid.*, 309.

⁵¹ Mari Yamamoto *Grassroots Pacifism in Post-war Japan: The Rebirth of a Nation* (New York: RoutledgeCurzon, 2004), 40.

a Kyoto University law professor and world federalism activist Tabata Shigejirō (1911-2001) divides such theories roughly between “minimalist” and “maximalist” conceptions of world government.⁵² While they all share the basic goal of eradicating war, they differ significantly in the scale of their ambitions. Minimalist theories of world government transfer from the nation-state into the hands of a world government only those powers necessary for the complete prevention of war. Since they only critique the nation to the extent that they see it as an inevitable source of military conflict “minimalists” share enough in common with the classical internationalists that differences between their theories of world order can often be reduced to a disagreement on the technicalities. More conservative, or Minimalist supporters of the world federalist movement, for example, may strongly support a global institution with complete control over militaries and technologies related to nuclear power, but might also hold out hope that the United Nations may be gradually strengthened and reformed to assume this role.

Maximalists, on the other hand, go beyond the transfer of formal sovereignty, military power, and nuclear technology to a world government to support various forms of global democracy or constitutionally guaranteed political and economic rights. The most important of these Maximalist approaches to transnational idealism that would find frequent mention in Japanese postwar journals was named the Committee to Frame a World Constitution. The Committee, led by Giuseppe Borgeese and Robert Maynard Hutchins, met for the first time at the University of Chicago in the fall of 1945 and

⁵² Tabata Shigejiro *Sekai seifu no shisō* (Tokyo: Iwanami Shinsho, 1950), 12-13.

continued to be affiliated with the university until 1951.⁵³ Together the committee members created a draft world constitution completed in 1947. This radical document proposed vast powers for a world federation which included the power to create and alter




Fig. 1 Electoral Regions in the Chicago Constitution. Sadayoshi Miyakawa *New Age Bible & A World Constitution* (Yokohama, 1954), 21.

boundaries of existing states, extensive judicial powers, economic and welfare provisions, and the establishment of regional electoral colleges (Japan to share one with China, Korea, and various Pacific islands, see Fig. 1). The published version of this draft was eventually translated into dozens of languages and reached a circulation of an estimated one million copies.⁵⁴

To the extent that Minimalists do not discuss the relationship between their national loyalties and their immediate demands for a world government, we cannot always determine whether their more limited approach is based on pragmatic considerations or out of a desire to preserve a place for nationalism in the New Order. In fact, the sheer urgency felt by supporters and their willingness to contemplate numerous alternatives results in a highly diverse range of theories being marshaled in support of both more conservative and radical goals. Thus we find the Chicago constitution quoted or mentioned in articles which claim to disavow a more radical departure from the past.

⁵³ John W. Boyer "Drafting Salvation" *University of Chicago Magazine* Vol. 8 No. 2 (December 1995) <http://magazine.uchicago.edu/9512/9512Salvation.html> (Accessed December 4, 2005)

⁵⁴ *Preliminary Draft of a World Constitution* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1948). On languages and circulation see Boyer *ibid.*

On the Minimalist side, perhaps the most important inspirations for global federalism to impact the postwar boom is to be found in the book *Union Now* by Clarence Streit (1896-1986). It was seen by many in 1939 as providing an alternative to Marxism and Fascism, though the work is all but forgotten now.⁵⁵ Similar to Kant's argument in *On Eternal Peace* that a world government depends on a union of republics, Streit outlines a form of global federation limited in its membership to only mature democracies. His insistence on excluding Communist and other non-democratic nations created a split in the nascent federalist movement as early as 1941. He remained a popular figure and symbol of the new movement, his face even decorating the cover of an issue of *Time* magazine in 1950. *Union Now* so impressed publisher Henry Luce that in the famous 1941 essay "The American Century" he goes so far as to say that, "no thoughtful American has done his duty by the United States of America until he has read and pondered Clarence Streit's book presenting that proposal."⁵⁶ Other movements active during the war and early postwar in the United States include the Federal Union, the Atlantic Union Committee, the ABC Plan organization, and the Crusade for World Government.⁵⁷ Garry Davis's world citizen's campaign also began in the early postwar period in 1948 when he tore up his U.S. passport, and he was soon followed by several hundreds of thousands of supporters, including Albert Camus, in declaring himself a "citizen of the world."⁵⁸

⁵⁵ Joseph Preston Baratta "The International History of the World Federalist Movement" *Peace & Change* Vol. 14 No. 4 (October 1989), 374.

⁵⁶ See the reprint of Henry Luce "The American Century" in *Diplomatic History* 23, no. 2 (Spring 1999): 164. The original was published in the February 1941 issue of *Life* magazine.

⁵⁷ Ernest S. Lent "The Development of United World Federalist Thought and Policy" *International Organization* Vol. 9, No. 4 (November, 1955), 486.

⁵⁸ Baratta *ibid.*, 378. Garry Davis still runs his world citizen campaign under the name "World Service Authority and more can be read at their homepage, <http://www.worldservice.org/>

Separately, a number of American world federalist organizations united in 1947 under the name of the United World Federalists after two years overcoming tensions between an elite wing of federalists and their grassroots counterparts, only then going on to form a global organization by the name of the World Movement for World Federal Government in 1947.⁵⁹ The movement grew quickly in numbers and influence in its initial few years, with over a hundred members of the U.S. House of Representatives supporting a world federation resolution and several state legislatures adopting world government resolutions.⁶⁰ In response to a 1946 Gallup poll asking, “Do you think the United Nations organization should be strengthened to make it a world government with power to control the armed forces of all nations, including the U.S. (United States)?” 56% were in favor, and only 26% opposed.⁶¹ The ideas behind world federalism had wide popular and political support.

However, the movement peaked both in the United States and worldwide on the eve of the Korean War, with the ultimately negligible size of about 151,000 members.⁶² Its membership plummeted soon after the opening of hostilities, government resolutions were repealed and the movement as a whole lost its momentum and relevance, continuing today with only a few thousand members worldwide.⁶³

⁵⁹ Joseph Preston Baratta “The International Federalist Movement: Toward Global Governance” *Peace & Change* Vol. 24 No. 3 (July 1999), 340-1.

⁶⁰ Tabata claims 21 state legislatures passed such resolutions by 1950. See Tabata *ibid.*, 16

⁶¹ Gallup Poll – A.I.P.O (August 1946) Gallup Organization. 375K, QK02. According to a similar poll in the wake of increased Cold War tensions of 1948, this support had dropped to 39% in favor and 42% against. See National Opinion Research Center (April 1948) USNORC 480157, R05. Tabata argues that support is still at 56% in 1947, citing a Gallup Poll from September 1947. See Tabata *ibid.*, 15.

⁶² On government resolutions see Lent *ibid.*, 498, on membership numbers, Baratta “The International Federalist Movement” *ibid.*, 342.

⁶³ On plummeting numbers see Lent *ibid.*, 498. The organization is now known as the World Federalist Movement. For more on the current organization see their homepage at <http://www.wfm.org/>. Other organizations, such as that of Garry Davis and others continued to be popular but never benefited from the legacy of strong political support.

The organized world federalist movement originally eschewed the more limited vision of Streit and the supporters of an Atlantic federalist union of the old liberal democracies, and it hoped to create a truly global community which included the Soviet Union. The Chicago committee founders were also deeply concerned with issues of economic justice, and hoped to find some non-totalitarian social democratic system that could be acceptable to all parties, but ultimately world federalism came to serve the anti-Communist camp in the 1950s and 1960s.⁶⁴ Even before this shift became obvious, the Soviet Union made its position very clear. Despite itself declaring the aim of establishing a world union of socialist republics as early as 1922, it repeatedly condemned the postwar world federalist movement's reactionary "cosmopolitanism" and suggested that capitalism, rather than the nation-state system was what ultimately led to international conflict.⁶⁵

Early Support for World Federalism in Japan

The character of the world federalist movement in the West, and opposition to the movement from the Soviet Union on the basis that it denied the centrality of class conflict and economic injustice in establishing world peace are important for understanding the development of the world federalist movement in Japan, which together with India, was the only strong movement outside of Europe and the United States. The movement for establishing a world government in Japan, however, cannot simply be seen as a derivative movement inspired by the developments towards federalism in the United States or Europe. The *Taiwa Shinron* publication discussed above, for example, starts as early as

⁶⁴ Baratta "The International Federalist Movement" *ibid.*, 346. Baratta dates this "dark" period from 1951-1967.

⁶⁵ Elliot R. Goodman "The Soviet Union and World Government" *The Journal of Politics* Vol. 15, No. 2 (May, 1953), 232-233. They also condemned Garry Davis when he refused to take sides in the Cold War, see p242-3.

1946. While it shows optimism for the future of the United Nations, this new global institution was very clearly an inter-national organization with only the weakest of limitations on state sovereignty.⁶⁶ The United Nations was modeled on its predecessor, the League of Nations, but had the strong added component condoning the collective use of force to preserve international security.⁶⁷ The transnational visions put forth by many Japanese in publications of the early postwar clearly went well beyond such limited conceptions, something clear even in the unusual case of *Taiwa Shinron*.

This small regional publication was far from the first to voice such ambitions in postwar Japan, however. Support for a united humanity, a global government, or world federalism in Japan came in many forms. The terms for such a world government also varied, and included *sekai seifu* [“World Government” 世界政府], *sekai kokka* [“World State” 世界国家], *jinrui dōmei* [“The League of Humanity” 人類同盟], and in a word revealing the closest connection to the international movement, *sekai renpō* [“World Federation” 世界連邦]. The above mentioned more radical prewar terms *sekaishugi* and *kosumoporitanizumu* can also be found. It should be noted, however, that many authors used several of these terms interchangeably.

Already by November of 1945 *sekai kokka* was being discussed as the only solution for establishing permanent peace in the world with articles in *Shūkan Shinnihon* [“The New Japan Weekly” 週刊新日本] and *Hi no de* [“Dawn” 日の出].⁶⁸ The second of these articles was written by Kagawa Toyohiko [賀川豊彦] (1888-1960), a Christian

⁶⁶ The only significant negative prohibition in the United Nations charter is found in 1.2.4 “All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.” This clause does not guarantee any condemnation or action on the part of the United Nations, however.

⁶⁷ Akami *ibid.*, 271.

⁶⁸ [no author listed] “Sekai kokka no rinen” *Shūkan Shinnihon* Vol. 1 No. 10 (November, 1945) [ZW05 S2333], 3. Toyohiko Kagawa “Heiwa kokka no kakuritsu” *Hi no De* Vol. 14 No. 6 (November 1945) [ZW05 H453], 9-11.

missionary well-known both inside and outside of Japan for his pacifism. Kagawa was also supportive of the Japanese war with the United States, however, contributed to war propaganda writings for the government's Information Bureau and is also alleged to have supported the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity policy in China during the war.⁶⁹ In the occupation period Kagawa was strongly supported by SCAP authorities who hailed him as a peace activist and protected him from critics within Japan that tried to cast light on his wartime activities. Kagawa went on to contribute some 58 articles as chief editor of *Sekai Kokka*, a magazine dedicated to world government with a strong Christian tone. These contributions make up a significant proportion of the 274 total articles by him that remain in the Prange archive from 1945-1949.⁷⁰ Indeed a number of Kagawa's writings in other journals also relate to world government.⁷¹

In addition to his reputation as a peace activist, however, Kagawa was also appreciated by occupation authorities for his staunch anti-Communism, a theme which he was able to smoothly incorporate into his support for social reform and world federalism. In a 1946 *Sekai Kokka* article entitled "Perfect Love" he argued that, "It is a mistake to believe, as the materialist Communists do, in the creation of equality through the communal ownership of property. There is no power which can create equality in society other than love...there is nothing which can truly reform society other than love."⁷² The global world federalist movement largely supported the peaceful

⁶⁹ Matsutani Motokazu "Kagawa Toyohiko and the Japanese Christian Reaction to the US Occupation" Unpublished Paper 2004, p8. Ichikawa Hiromu argues that the origins of Kagawa's support for Japan's war efforts can be found in his identification of Japan's economic problems with its high population and his increasing involvement in efforts promoting Japanese emigration to Manchuria and elsewhere. See Ichikawa Hiromu "1930 nendai ni okeru Kagawa Toyohiko no heiwa undō" *Nihonshi Kenkyū* 424 (December, 1997), 73.

⁷⁰ The magazine was published by the International Peace Association or "kokusai heiwa kyōkai" In addition to the Christian tone of its contents, several issues from 1948 featured a cover that included a Christian cross hovering above the earth and several white doves which might as easily symbolize the Holy Spirit as they do international peace.

⁷¹ Including "Sekai kokka no kōsō" *Kokka to Shūkyō* Vol. 258 (July, 1946) [ZH06 K1523], 4-6..

⁷² Kagawa Toyohiko "Kanzen naru ai" *Sekai Kokka* 2.6 (August, September 1946), 1. [ZA05 S773]

incorporation of the Communist world until the mid-1950s, Kagawa very early tries to emphasize their incompatibility, echoing Streit. The anti-Communist tone of a January 1947 article “War Can be Avoided” was so strong that it merited comment (but not censorship) from the CCD examiner. An entire passage which argued that Communism and class struggle necessarily spread violence and war, and concluded that only a peaceful world federalism could bring mankind together was underlined and labeled by the examiner, “Kagawa’s anti-com. opinion.”

Sekai Kokka was only one of several specialist journals which appeared in the early postwar period that focused on the vision of a world government, although it is the earliest to appear, beginning publication in January of 1947. It was followed soon after in February by *Jinrui dōmei* and in March with the journal *Hitotsu no Sekai* [“One World” 一つの世界]. The last of these specialized journals to appear was *Sekai Renpō*, in August of 1948, but it is the only journal specifically tied to the international federalist movement. The cover of its opening issue has a “Declaration” stating its goals, and written in English:

The WORLD FEDERATION proposes to banish ignorance and violence from the earth and build a new world order, under which all peoples may enjoy liberty, equality and perpetual peace.

The WORLD FEDERATION crystallizes the lofty aspiration and ideal underlying Japan’s new Constitution, which renounces war forever as a sovereign right of the nation. It envisages a world organization for world peace and world brotherhood. The attainment of this goal is not a dream but an urgent task of the moment which must be accomplished before it is too late, if mankind is to be saved from the recurrent cataclysms of war and from ultimate extinction.

The LEAGUE subscribes to the principles and programs laid down by the WORLD FEDERATION at Geneva in August, 1947, and pledges its [unreadable] support and cooperation toward the realization of the high purpose of that organization.

An invitation to join the ALL JAPAN LEAGUE FOR WORLD FEDERATION [世界連邦全日本連盟] is extended to all Japanese and all persons residing in Japan, without distinctions of sex, nationality, color and religion...⁷³

The issue's back cover claims that some 80 Diet members had joined the federation, and its list of directors included Matsuoka Komakichi (松岡駒吉 Chairman of the House of Representatives), Kuriyama Shigeru (栗山茂 Supreme Court Judge), four sitting or ex-cabinet ministers, fifteen Diet members, law professors from Tokyo University and Waseda University, and various other corporate leaders and journalists.

This cover declaration is, like many of the statements of the movement, relatively vague. However, the *Sekai Rempō*'s support for the principles of the federation are laid out in greater detail in a Japanese translation of the Montreux Declaration of 1947, a copy of which is provided on each issue's inside cover. It includes an elaboration of the five central features of the new World Federation:

1. All of the peoples [民族] and nations [国家] of the world can participate.
2. National sovereignty will be limited, and all legislative, executive and judicial powers related to world affairs will be transferred to the World Federation.
3. World law will be enforced for all individuals no matter who they might be, within the jurisdiction of the World Federation. The World Federation will guarantee human rights and will protect the security of the federation.
4. A supranational military force, capable of guaranteeing the security of the world federal government and of its member states will be created. Member nations must disarm their militaries and retain only that which is necessary for internal policing.
5. The World Federation will control the development of atomic technology and any other scientific discoveries capable of mass destruction.
6. The World Federation will have the power to raise taxes directly and independently of individual national budgets.⁷⁴

Notice that clauses three and six stretch the limits of a “minimalist” approach to world government by allowing the federation to protect the human rights of individuals and raise taxes directly. As the formal mouthpiece of the Japanese League of World

⁷³ *Sekai Rempō* Vol. 1 No. 1 (August, 1948) cover. [ZA05 S779]

⁷⁴ *ibid.*, inside cover.

Federation, the *Sekai Renpō* is the most consistent in its proposals and sticks closely to developments in the international movement. However, the other journals experimented with a number of variations on the theme of world government. *Jinrui dōmei*, whose motto is “Towards a league for humanity; the Earth is jointly owned and controlled by all of humanity” and the flavor of its articles have a more philosophical and spiritual tone including for example, review essays of the ethical philosophy of Nishida Kitarō and many reflections on the nature of religion and humanity’s relation to nature. *Hitotsu no Sekai*, on the other hand, includes numerous articles on other conceptions of world government, as well as articles focusing on developments related to the existing United Nations. In many issues it features a “World Government News” section summarizing various developments world wide, whether it be official news from the world federalist movement or something as obscure as half a dozen influential scientists in New Zealand pronouncing their allegiance to some form of world government.⁷⁵

While these four publications specialize almost completely on various conceptions of world federalism and global government, many other publications dedicated to peace, democracy, or world affairs publish more than a few articles on the topic of world government. *Sekai no Ugoki* [“World Trends” 世界の動き], for example, shows particularly strong interest. More importantly, articles supporting world federalism are also found in the pages of at least two of the most popular journals in Japan. *Sekai* published two articles supporting the creation of a world government by the international law scholar and future supreme court justice Yokota Kizaburō [横田喜三郎] (1896-1993) in 1946 and 1948. *Chūō Kōron* published the article “The Role of Scientists in War and Peace” by Hirano Yoshitarō [平野義太郎] which focuses on the role

⁷⁵ “Sekai seifu nyūzu” *Hitotsu no sekai* Vol. 2 No. 8 (August, 1948), 17. [ZA05 H520]

of scientists in the world federalist movement in 1948 while Tanikawa Tetsuzō [谷川徹三] (1895-1989) describes the choice that the world faces quite explicitly in his “World Government or World Destruction: The World Federalist Movement and the World Constitution” in a later 1949 issue.⁷⁶

In a relatively long article Tanikawa carefully details both the proposals for a world federation and world constitutional proposals, including some of the problems and objections which have been raised up until this point. His conclusion strikes a pessimistic note, voicing concern for the growing opposition between “the two worlds” of the Cold War. For all the postwar enthusiasm for world peace, Tanikawa notes cynically that the word “peace” has already become a word behind which the powers build their military power. Ending with a quote from a comment attached to the Chicago draft of the world constitution which states that world government and peace can only be achieved through justice [正義], Tanikawa argued that the biggest challenge for the world government movement is determining exactly what justice really means.⁷⁷

Tanikawa was an important cultural theorist and philosopher who graduated from the rich intellectual environment of Kyoto University’s philosophy department in 1922. He was a harsh critic of Japan’s uncritical absorption of Western culture and wrote extensively about the “Japanese mind” and the essential differences between the Orient and the West from a cultural standpoint.⁷⁸ Tanikawa, who borrowed some of his Orientalist cultural categories from Karl Sapper, divided the Orient into five cultural

⁷⁶ Hirano Yoshitarō “Sensō to heiwa ni okeru kagaku no yakuwari” *Chūō Kōron* Vol 4 (April 1948), 6-12. [ZW01 C271] and Tanikawa Tetsuzō “Sekai seifu ka sekai hametsu ka: sekai renpō undo to sekai kempō” *Chūō Kōron* Vol 10 (October, 1949), 8-23.

⁷⁷ Tanikawa *ibid.*, 23.

⁷⁸ See for example Tanikawa Tetsuzō *Nihonjin no kokoro* (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1938) and *Tōyō to seiyō* (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1940). In a “revised edition” of his essays on East and West published after the war, Tanikawa notes apologetically in the postscript the fact that his essays “are not without statements that are somewhat inappropriate from the point of view of the current state of the world and Japan’s place in it.” See Tanikawa Tetsuzō *Tōyō to seiyō: kaitei ban* (Tokyo: Kadokawa Shoten, 1949), 263.

groups and argued for the creation of a dynamic new culture to avoid inevitable stagnation.⁷⁹ However, Takikawa was no fan of racial mixing within the regions controlled by Japan, however, especially along the outer rim of the “East.” During an exchange with Abe Yoshishige (1883-1966) and Watsuji Tetsurō [和辻哲郎] (1889-1960) at a private conference sponsored by the Japanese Navy in 1942, he voiced his concern about relationships between Japanese men and island women, worrying that their children might run about naked with the other natives.⁸⁰ In the aftermath of war, however, he joined Watsuji and other intellectuals in the “Dōshinkai” [同心会] that led to the creation of the *Sekai* magazine at the end of 1945 and published widely during the occupation in support of world peace, democracy, and overcame his strong opposition to Western universalism to support world federalism because, like so many others, he feared the imminent destruction of all of humanity.⁸¹

Support for a world government in the early postwar, judged merely by the authorship of articles related to world government in the journals of this period and the leading membership of the official All Japan League for World Federalism, shows a strong presence among the ranks of two groups in particular: 1) liberal minded politicians, many of whom may have been strong supporters of Japan’s imperial wars. 2) academic scholars of international law, some of which had not published works since the 1920s. Perhaps the most important writer to support world federalism among the former group is Ozaki Yukio. Among the latter, Yokota Kizaburō, Rōyama Masamichi [蠟山政道] Tabata Shigejirō [田畑茂次郎], and Inagaki Morikatsu [稻垣守克] have the most to say on

⁷⁹ Yamamuro Shin’ichi *Shisō kadai toshite no ajia* (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 2001) 104.

⁸⁰ Oguma Eiji *Tanitsu minzoku shinwa no kigen* (Tokyo: Shinyōsha, 1995), 330.

⁸¹ On his involvement in the founding of *Sekai* see Oguma Eiji *Minshū to aikoku* (Tokyo: Shinyōsha, 2002), 477. Tanikawa later chaired the literature department of Hōsei University and also served as its president from 1963-1965.

the topic of world government in the journals of the day. While Rōyama also belongs to the class of intellectuals who led the way in developing theories of Asian regional unity, he shares with these other legal scholars a strong emphasis on the legal structures necessary to support any political order.

Instead of limiting themselves to one journal, each of writers can be found writing articles supporting world government, and world federalism in particular, throughout many or almost all of the publications discussed above. In some cases, such as in articles by Ozaki and Inagaki, the contents are highly repetitive, with whole passages remaining almost identical from article to article. Other writers such as Yokota, offer more sophisticated analyses, which focus on a particular problem or aspect of theories of world government.

Not all of the articles supporting a conception of world government support or even mention the world federalist movement and there is a great deal of diversity in the specific proposals involved. What they generally have in common, however, is 1) A strong fear of a future conflict, especially with the prospect of future wars involving nuclear weapons. They believe that there is an urgent need to immediately establish an institution to guarantee “permanent peace in the world” [世界の恒久平和] by removing the threat of international conflict. 2) The authors, almost without exception, believe that Japan, as an exhausted victim of war and nuclear attack, or more often, as a country with a new constitution completely renouncing war, is uniquely positioned to be a leader in the movement to establish a world government.

Ozaki Yukio's Support for World Federalism

By far the most enthusiastic, prolific, and somewhat repetitive voice supporting world federalism in the early postwar period was the politician Ozaki Yukio [尾崎行雄] (1858-1954). Ozaki served in every Japanese Diet from 1890 to 1952, and concurrently served as Tokyo's mayor from 1903 to 1912. Ozaki was a supporter of universal suffrage and is well remembered for his dedication to democracy and efforts against militarism. Throughout his autobiography, and published musings Ozaki portrays himself as a crusader for the people and for peace.

There are, however, some chinks in the self-styled crusader's armor. Especially for the first half of his career Ozaki is an excellent example of an imperial democrat who saw no contradiction between his efforts on behalf of limited political reforms, and a bold and occasionally militant Japanese empire abroad. Ozaki also despised strikes as a disorderly approach to resolving political issues, had nothing but distrust for class conflict, socialism, and opposed the introduction to some political and social liberties.⁸² Ozaki was particularly concerned with distasteful moral practices, and wanted to place them under government regulation.⁸³ In 1929, Ozaki Yukio and other "progressive" politicians opposed the passing of the proposed Pact of Paris (Kellogg-Briand Pact), an early attempt to eradicate war. This is an especially surprising fact given Ozaki's promotion of world peace and world federalism in the aftermath of war but at the time political opportunism may have been a factor. Opponents argued that since the pact was

⁸² See Douglas H. Mendel, Jr. "Ozaki Yukio: Political Conscience of Modern Japan" *The Far Eastern Quarterly* 15.3 (May 1956) 343-356.

⁸³ Sheldon Garon *Molding Japanese Minds: The State in Everyday Life* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1997), 108

to be pronounced in the name of the people, it was therefore a violation of the sovereignty of the Emperor.⁸⁴

At the close of the war Ozaki was already approaching ninety years of age but seemed to have a new lease of energy that he threw into support for World Federalism. Interestingly, although there is much mention of his opposition to militarism, “narrow nationalism” and support for world peace, there is no mention of world federalism in Ozaki’s revised autobiography, which covers events through 1950.⁸⁵ The strongest hint of his support for a conception of world government comes when he discusses his 1931 trip abroad. Lamenting the prevalence of international conflicts Ozaki shares his thoughts at the time, “If we can only manage to imbue the League of Nations with a large enough vision the world will be able in the future to overcome its present political and economic difficulties.”⁸⁶ We can also find a strong internationalism, albeit not yet in its more radical form, in a speech he gave in New York in the uncomfortable aftermath of the Manchurian incident late in the same year. In one section of his speech Ozaki declared:

All empires and nations are founded on might instead of right. Unless this fundamental condition for the existence of nations is reformed, the unamiable spirit that governs their relations will never be eradicated. Let us try to make all the nations of the world stand on a moral basis by accepting the authority of the International Court of Justice and by ceasing to teach narrow nationalism to their citizens. International relations should be based on friendship and goodwill instead of on jealousy and antagonism. Peace and security can only be obtained through friendship. Canada and the United States share a border more than 3,000 miles long with virtually no defenses on either side, yet they have no fear of each other and they feel secure. This good example can be followed by the other nations of the world...⁸⁷

⁸⁴ Akami *ibid.*, 116.

⁸⁵ Ozaki Yukio, Hara Fujiko trans. *The Autobiography of Ozaki Yukio: The Struggle for Constitutional Government in Japan* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001). Aoki Kazuyoshi argues that Ozaki first argued for a kind of world federalism as early as 1933. See Aoki Kazuyoshi “Ozaki yukio no heiwa shisō to sekai renpō ron” in Sōma Yukika et al. *Gakudō Ozaki Yukio* (Tokyo: Keio UP Sensho, 2000), 130.

⁸⁶ *ibid.*, 376.

⁸⁷ *ibid.*, 378.

Finally, we can find another aspect of Ozaki's postwar views for radical reform in his otherwise unhelpful autobiography in the remarkable list of demands Ozaki issued to any candidate who might want his endorsement in the first postwar election. While the list includes other unusual items forbidding them to "beg voters" for support, requiring them to reform "bad habits such as drinking, smoking, and frequenting prostitutes" as well more customary pleas to "act in the interests of the nation" there is one demand which would become a part of Ozaki's radical reform ideas in many of his articles on world federalism:

5. I shall strive to abolish the use of *kanji* (Chinese characters) and improve the Japanese language.⁸⁸

The latter half of this unusual demand was later dropped in Ozaki's articles and he increasingly argued for the complete abandonment of the Japanese language.

Ozaki's most concrete act in support of the creation of a World Federation was the submission, on December 11th, 1947 of a draft resolution to the 89th extraordinary session of the Diet entitled "A Draft Resolution on the formation of a World Federation" [世界連邦建設ニ関スル決議案].⁸⁹ In addition to early support in the Diet in pronouncements by Ozaki himself, the idea of a World Federation would be brought up in no less than 54 different sessions of the Diet in its first decade of activity.⁹⁰

In early postwar general magazines Ozaki writes articles on world federalism in several publications, including *Hitotsu no Sekai*, *Jikyoku* [時局], *Jinrui Dōmei*, *Sekai Renpō*, and *Chūbu Minron* [中部民論] but they almost all make the same arguments.⁹¹ 1)

⁸⁸ *ibid.*, 426.

⁸⁹ The text of this resolution can be found in Aoki Kazuyoshi *ibid.*, 140-142.

⁹⁰ As found by a search on the online Diet records at <http://kokkai.ndl.go.jp/> through the year 1955. Diet member Kikuchi Yoshirō [菊池義郎君] is another supporter of World Federalism who makes a frequent appearance in the early years.

⁹¹ For the points below, I'm summarizing several Ozaki articles, which all repeat the same arguments. These include Ozaki Yukio "Sotsurō seidan" *Hitotsu no Sekai* 2.1 (January 1948), 2-7. "Sotsurō seidan II" *Hitotsu no Sekai* 2.2

Ozaki argues for the natural development of an ever-growing sense of community. The creation of a world federation is like a second eradication of the feudal *han* [藩] domains in 1871. The idea of a world federation is a modest and practical solution to the establishment of eternal peace. 2) More than any technical difficulties with the transfer of sovereignty to the new world body, the most important element to the creation of a united world community is education. The education of children should be directed to the task of creating truly international citizens who are thoroughly global in their identity. 3) Japanese children waste far too much time on the learning of Chinese characters. In order to meet the demands of an increasingly international education and to promote international communication, *kanji* should be eradicated and eventually the Japanese language should be eliminated as the national tongue. Instead, some kind of international language should be adopted. English is one possibility, but Esperanto or some other constructed language is to be preferred. 4) Regional blocs should be avoided. These will only act as “super-states” that will inevitably come into conflict with each other.

What is unique about Ozaki’s writing on world federalism is his consistent emphasis on language and education. While the World Federation can be (if created without a far reaching constitution along the lines of the Chicago draft) a very minimalist project. However, Ozaki goes beyond prewar internationalist calls to overcome “narrow nationalism” and promote “international cooperation” to create world citizens who speak

(February 1948), 2-7. “Sekai renpō no kensetsu” *Hitotsu no Sekai* 1.1 (March 1947), 7-11. “Daini no haihan chiken taru sekai renpō kensetsu no konpon shisō” *Hitotsu no Sekai* 1.2 (April, May 1947) 4-15. A longer, almost identical version of this article by the same title in *Jikyoku* 132 (December 1946) [ZA01 J108], 1-25. “Sekai kokka no mokuhyō” *Jinrui Dōmei* 4 (October 1947) [ZH02 J141], 53. “Sekai no shōrai” *Jikyoku* 135 (October, 1947), 2-6.

a common language. The only other major source of such radical calls for language reform in the early postwar comes from within the Japanese Esperanto movement.

While the language never reached significant numbers of speakers, its surges of popularity follow surges in internationalist enthusiasm. While the language has its origins in the end of the 19th century, its first real boom comes in the aftermath of World War I. A 1920 League of Nations resolution declared a hope that it would be taught to children throughout the world and in the next few years many countries brought similar resolutions to the League.⁹² A 1922 issue of *Kaizō* officially changed its title into Esperanto, and by 1928 Japan had the largest concentration of Esperantists outside of Europe, far ahead of the United States.⁹³ Its supporters included both classic liberal internationalists and a more radical socialist wing.⁹⁴ In wartime, however, the movement grew more nationalistic, and its publication *Esperanto (La Revuo Orienta)* ceased to publish altogether in 1944. It resumed very early after the war, with its first issue coming out only two months after the defeat of Japan in October, 1945. The movement was flattered by Ozaki's tentative support for their international language and published an article discussing his efforts in November, 1946.⁹⁵

Sugimori Kōjirō, World Federalism, and the New World Religion of the Rational

Leading Japanese intellectuals came to support conceptions of world government by a number of paths. For figures like Ozaki Yukio and Yokota Kizaburō support for

⁹² Akira Iriye *Cultural Internationalism and World Order* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1997), 76.

⁹³ Young S. Kim "Constructing a Global Identity: The Role of Esperanto" in John Boli and George M. Thomas eds. *Constructing World Culture: International Nongovernmental Organizations Since 1875* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1999), 135. Total European "Esperantists" in 1928 is estimated at 109,680, then 6903 in Japan, 4845 in the United States followed by Brazil and Australia.

⁹⁴ See Hatsushiba Takemi *Nihon esuperanto undō shi* (Tokyo: Japana Esperanto-Instituto, 1998) and for the latter especially see Ōshima Yoshio *Han taisei esuperanto undōshi* (Tokyo: Sanseidō, 1974). For a connection to pan-Asianism, see ch. 3 on Kita Ikki.

⁹⁵ "Ozaki Yukio wo tou" *Esuperanto* 14.3 (November 1946) [ZK31 E160], 1.

world federalism or more radical conceptions of transnational idealism grew out of a growing disappointment with earlier internationalist attempts at preserving world peace. For pan-Asianists, world federalism was a natural extension of their regional theories of Asian unity. For many religious figures like Kagawa Toyohiko, an unfettered and undifferentiating love for mankind composed the bulk of arguments for pacifism and world unity, even if their wartime actions often revealed its limits.

The pragmatist philosopher, sociologist, journalist, and self-styled prophet of rationality, Sugimori Kōjirō [杉森孝次郎] (1881-1968), like Kagawa, also incorporated religion into his arguments for world government. As a government supported student Sugimori left Japan in 1913 to study ethics and philosophy in England and Germany. After his return and graduation from Waseda University's philosophy department he served as a professor in both Waseda's department of economics and department of literature. Together with other pragmatist philosophers such as Tanaka Ōdō [田中王堂] (1867-1932) and an important translator of John Dewey, Hoashi Riichirō [帆足理一郎] (1881-1963), Sugimori helped establish Waseda as the center of the pragmatist movement in Japan and when John Dewey visited Japan in 1919, he associated with both Hoashi and Sugimori.⁹⁶ In the 1920s, Sugimori was a popular writer and critic in the most read journals of the time, achieving "star" status.⁹⁷ Later, however, Sugimori was an advisor to the pro-fascist politician and ultra-nationalist Nakano Seigo [中野正剛] (1886-1943), became president of the Japan Publicists Association, and a wartime member of the Great Japan Patriotic Writers Association [大日本言論報告会] under the

⁹⁶ For pragmatism at Waseda see Gino K. Piovesana S.J. *Recent Japanese Philosophical Thought 1862-1996: A Survey* (Tokyo: Japan Library, 1997 [1963]), 63. On Dewey's visit and Sugimori see Naoko Saito "Education for Global Understanding: Learning from Dewey's Visit to Japan" *Teachers College Record* 105.9 (December, 2003), 1772 n. 6.

⁹⁷ See Shoichi Koseki *The Birth of Japan's Postwar Constitution* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1997), 30-31.

leadership of Tokutomi Sohō [徳富蘇峰] (1863-1957).⁹⁸ In the aftermath of the war Sugimori served as Chairman of the League of Men of Culture and played a modest role in critiquing a draft of the new constitution.⁹⁹

Dick Stegewerns has done research Sugimori's transnational idealism and his participation in the above mentioned 1921 *Chūō Kōron* debate on nationalism and internationalism. Unlike most other participants who argued that nationalism and internationalism were compatible, Sugimori advanced his own unique theories and Stegewerns notes that Sugimori, "was in a world of his own" when he supported a radical cosmopolitanism which included state competition for the allegiance of citizens.¹⁰⁰ As Sugimori says in his contribution, "Henceforth, free trade and open immigration [自由帰化] will be the hero and heroine of international relations."¹⁰¹ In the same article, however, we find some more his ideas on international order which he continues to uphold through to the occupation period. Sugimori acknowledges the understandable motives that go into the creation of an ethnic nation-state, "The reason we attach such importance to nationalism is that it is not easy to eradicate the possibility of an invasion of our people."¹⁰² What is needed is a new "humanist enlightenment movement" [人類的啓蒙運動], and the establishment of a "new humanism [新人類主義], that is to say a new individualism [新個性主義]." The solution to US-Japan tensions and Sino-Japanese tensions is to be found in "the restructuring of the fundamental organization of world

⁹⁸ See Piovesana *ibid.*, 69 and Ben-Ami Shillony *Politics and Culture in Wartime Japan* (New York: Clarendon Press, 1981), 114.

⁹⁹ Koseki *ibid.*, 154. Koseki also speculates that Sugimori may have played a role in translation of a revised draft of the constitution presented to SCAP. See Koseki *ibid.* 34-35.

¹⁰⁰ Stegewerns "The Dilemma of Nationalism and Internationalism" *ibid.*, 10.

¹⁰¹ Sugimori Kōjirō "Buryokushugi to tatakau bunkashugi no tate no sujin" *Chūō Kōron* 36.2 (February, 1921), 50. The text clearly says 国隊関係 but I assume this is a typo and it was most likely meant to be 國際關係 (but possibly 国家關係).

¹⁰² Sugimori *ibid.*, 51.

states.”¹⁰³ The theoretical underpinnings of this approach is explained in more detail only one month earlier in the previous issue of *Chūō Kōron* where Sugimori traces the evolution of natural units of human organization and the parallel development of human thought. At the current stage in history Sugimori approves of a strengthening of ethnic nationalism, but rejects any ethnic nationalism which supports an aggressive invasion of other peoples.¹⁰⁴ However, while he argues that a theory like socialism is a stage of human thought which is more advanced than nationalism, both are restricted to the world of political and economic thought, without ever expanding the cultural horizons of mankind. Therefore, ultimately, we must all transcend this too, in search of a more fundamental general principle [総原則] which, he argues, “we may call a religion.”¹⁰⁵

Two decades later, in 1941, Sugimori is still writing widely. Only months before the attack on Pearl Harbor, Sugimori drafts a response (translated into Japanese for the May “America special” issue of *Chūō Kōron*) to a joint statement on Japan issued by a group of Harvard law professors. He offers a rebuttal to each point of the Harvard statement, especially delighting in a response to the statement’s support for British and Dutch control over the fate of its colonies.¹⁰⁶ The following year in 1942 Sugimori published *On Construction of a New World Order* in which he declares that mankind is ready for the next historical stage.¹⁰⁷ In an analogy also used by Ozaki Yukio and in the writings of other transnational idealists, Sugimori refers to the current age as a second eradication of the *han* feudal domains and a turn to a “greater regionalism” [大地域主

¹⁰³ *ibid.*

¹⁰⁴ Sugimori Kōjirō “Minzokuteki danketsu to shisōteki danketsu” *Chūō Kōron* 36.1 (January, 1921), 45.

¹⁰⁵ *ibid.*, 47.

¹⁰⁶ The statement and Sugimori’s response to it can be found in *Chūō Kōron* 56.5 (May, 1941), 59-65.

¹⁰⁷ Sugimori Kōjirō *Shin sekai chitsujo kensetsu no sho* (Tokyo: Gengen Shobō, 1942).

義].¹⁰⁸ Sugimori argues that the Japanese people must realize that the creation of a Greater East Asia is their fundamental responsibility and any sentimental pacifism must be completely eliminated.¹⁰⁹ A whole chapter of the book is dedicated to a rethinking of the definition of religion. Instead, in order to succeed in the creation of a new world order in the aftermath of a Greater East Asia War it is crucial, he argued, that a new form of religious spirit be formed based on an all-embracing world vision and humanism. The state's religious policy should not merely be the management of existing or "old" religious but the active creation of this new "religious" universalism.¹¹⁰

After Japan's defeat Sugimori Kōjirō publishes over fifty articles in the first few years of occupation censorship, some within his field of ethics, but most of them related to world peace and world government. In Kagawa Toyohiko's Christian *Sekai Kokka* magazine, we find him showing a brief moment of regret for Japan's wartime past when he joins a dozen or so intellectuals in making New Year's greetings. Sugimori dedicates his wish to, "justice, progress, and a search for a rational humanitarianism [合理的汎愛]," but then adds parenthetically, "(Japanese must themselves first reflect [反省] on their turn to the right and catch up)"¹¹¹ Despite some evidence of regret, Sugimori never abandons his strong transnational idealism. He continues to support his unorthodox conception of a new world religion based on a kind of universal rationalism in the Buddhist publication *Sekai Heiwa*.¹¹²

Among the dozen or so early postwar calls Sugimori makes for the transition to the final stage of global unity, his most important contribution is the 1949 opening essay

¹⁰⁸ *ibid.*, 95.

¹⁰⁹ *ibid.*, 199.

¹¹⁰ *ibid.*, 229.

¹¹¹ Sugimori Kōjirō "Gōriteki han'ai wo" *Sekai Kokka* 2.1 (January, 1948), 9.

¹¹² Sugimori Kōjirō "Sekai banshō no kokoro no heiwa no jōken to shin sekai shūkyō" *Sekai Heiwa* 2.2 (May 1948) [ZH07 S763], 9-11. The magazine is published by the World Buddhist Peace Association [世界平和仏教会]

in the inaugural issue of *Jiyū Kōron* [自由公論] where he combines support for the World Federation movement with, again, a vague call for a new world religion.¹¹³ Interestingly, however, the intermediary step of a regional union, so central to his prewar and wartime pan-Asianist writing, is completely left out. “World Federalism is clearly the stage we must construct in the aftermath of the modern sovereign ethnic nationalism.”¹¹⁴

Sugimori shows little interest in this article for the technical details of whatever world government scheme wins out, something which becomes clear when he says that whatever else one might do to help modern humanity we, “should at the very least encourage the feelings and philosophy behind [the various] moves in the direction of world federalism, world government, world sovereignty, a world republic, world citizenship, world democracy, or new cosmopolitanism.”¹¹⁵ More important to Sugimori is the teleological progression of humanity towards world unity, something that is ultimately dependent upon an intellectual, if not a spiritual embrace of certain ideas. In his conclusion, Sugimori emphasizes that democracy is of the most universal of these, with even the Soviet Union supporting it, which one might note is an interesting thing to say in the early winter of 1948, as the Cold War is increasingly on everyone’s mind. Democracy, Sugimori can be called our society’s God [社会神].¹¹⁶

Japan’s Culture of Defeat

The message emphasizing the need to act immediately in order to prevent global conflict and a nuclear holocaust is found in many future publications by Japanese intellectuals. The three famous statements on world peace issued in 1948, 1949, and

¹¹³ Sugimori Kōjirō “Sekai renpō e no rinen” *Jiyūkōron* 1.1 (November, 1948) [ZW01 J243], 2-8.

¹¹⁴ *ibid.*, 2.

¹¹⁵ *ibid.*, 5.

¹¹⁶ *ibid.*, 8.

1950 (the latter two by the Peace Problems Symposium group which also emphasized the need to achieve a peace treaty with all countries, rather than only the Western bloc) shares this sense of urgency. However, the use of fear of a nuclear war is also absolutely central to world government supporters' arguments for their radical proposals. It is also an approach shared by the United World Federalists movement in the United States, for example. Up until the mid-1950s the UWF began many of their speeches and essays with an emphasis on the destructive nature of modern weapons and even showed movies with images of nuclear holocaust designed to instill the same sensation of fear.¹¹⁷

Japan's postwar constitution renouncing war goes further than any other in the world in its ninth article, in which, "Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of force as means of settling international disputes" and while the article has been flagrantly violated for most of Japan's postwar history further agrees not to maintain, "land, sea, and air forces, as well as other war potential." The constitution was not written or conceived by the Japanese people but they very quickly made it their own. The spirit of peace enshrined in this famous article became a powerful source of pride for several generations. However, it is often forgotten that Japan is not the only country in the postwar period to make bold declarations renouncing war. The postwar Italian constitution of 1948 begins its eleventh article with "Italy renounces war as an instrument of offense to the liberty of other peoples or as a means of settlement of international disputes..." and many postwar constitutions have explicit articles allowing for the limitation of sovereignty in order to establish international institutions for the maintenance of peace.

¹¹⁷ Lent *ibid.*, 497.

To view Japan's early postwar peace activism and even transnational idealism in isolation is to ignore the important international flow of ideas in the aftermath of war. While it has not been my approach, an entire history of transnational idealism in early postwar Japan, and especially support for the world federalist movement can be written which focuses on its powerful international dimension and the interaction between Japanese intellectuals or politicians and their counterparts around the world.

Another approach is to focus on the relationship between radical movements for world unity and experience of defeat itself. John W. Dower's history of occupation Japan dedicates a whole section to the "cultures of defeat" in postwar Japan. Among the numerous topics covered there include the opportunism of the black market, the occupation period's decadent art and literature, and a new flexibility of the mind.¹¹⁸ The last of these is of greatest importance in the case of transnational idealism. The powerful enthusiasm in early postwar writings for working towards world peace and the strong conviction that Japan can lead the way in the establishment of a world government can be partially explained by the very experience of defeat itself, and this new flexibility of the mind.

This was not something unique to Japan or the Second World War. In his work on *The Culture of Defeat* Wolfgang Schivelbusch examines the post-Civil War South, France in the aftermath of the Franco-Prussian War, and Germany in the aftermath of World War I eloquently describes precisely the same phenomenon:

This future promised not only internal renewal but a new role for the nation in the international community. It is a short step from understanding defeat as an act of purification, humility, and sacrifice—a crucifixion of sorts—to laying claim to spiritual and moral leadership in world affairs. The three loser nations discussed here took this step by transforming their philosophies of defeat into a

¹¹⁸ Dower *ibid.*, 121-168.

moral bulwark for the protection of all humanity. To accept their own defeat as a verdict by the court of world history was one thing; to sit idly by while all humanity was threatened by future disaster was quite another. Who, they reasoned, was better equipped to act as moral standard-bearer against such evils than those who had only recently stared them in the face?¹¹⁹

Almost identical words can be found opening the articles of many supporters of world federalism or world constitutions in early postwar Japanese publications. Is then transnational idealism in early postwar Japan the expression of a universal culture of defeat? I have offered nothing to contradict such a claim. What is certain, however, is that early postwar transnational idealism and many of the leading voices who support it in the aftermath of Japan's defeat bring to the public discourse ideas with deep roots in their wartime and prewar writing.

¹¹⁹ Wolfgang Schivelbusch *The Culture of Defeat: On National Trauma, Mourning, and Recovery* (New York: Picador, 2001), 31.

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Sekai Rempō [ZA05 S779]
Shūkan Shinnihon [ZW05 S2333]
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