I only met Professor Tilly once, but the experience left me even more impressed. I was working tech support for professors at Columbia University about 6 years ago and was called into his office to revive Windows on a recently upgraded machine he was working off of. He was incredibly friendly and instead of going on with some reading as he waited for me to tinker away at his computer, he pulled up a chair and asked me about my own studies, posing sharp questions about anything I said that sparked his interest, all as we waited for things to install and the computer to go through several restarts. I remember asking him about the relationship between the disciplines of sociology and history, and though the substance of his comments now escape me, I remember he went on for some time about it even when I had finished setting things up for him. I only wish all my customers while working for Faculty Desktop Support were as willing to chat with their visiting technician.

Today the top right quarter of the front page of the newspaper was dedicated to introducing a series of new articles on prices in Korea, entitled “해리포터 책값, 서울>도쿄>뉴욕” (“The Price of Harry Potter Books: Seoul > Tokyo > New York”). This was accompanied by a chart comparing the price of Harry Potter books 6 and 7 in five major cities.

If there is any phenomenon or fact worth reporting about Korea in the media, there is a very good chance that we will also learn how a quantification of that phenomenon compares with other OECD countries somewhere early in the report or article. Price index comparisons are, of course, something more commonly presented with such comparisons, but I had to chuckle when I saw this above the fold. When I lived in Japan, headlines like these would always prompt a, “日本は平和だな〜” (“Japan is such a peaceful place…”) I realized Korea was fairly peaceful too earlier this past summer when 20 minutes of the first half of an hour’s worth of the daily news (I can’t remember which channel) was dedicated to how citizens of Seoul are mobilizing to address the dangerous irregularities found occasionally in the metal hand bars found on a path in a city park (along the Han river? Can’t remember exactly) which had given rollerbladers cuts on their hands. They have apparently been putting some tape over the offending areas. I remember this was around the same time that huge floods in China had left thousands homeless and many dead. The floods didn’t make the news at all.

During my last two trips back to Norway, I noticed that the evening news on NRK (Dagsrevyen) had relatively heavy domestic coverage in terms of a straight minute calculation, and I guess I assume that this is the case with most countries. The middle east and large humanitarian crises, however, did seem to get considerable attention. Some national TV channels such as the news on BBC in the UK, and NHK in Japan have excellent international coverage but I’m not sure if that is because they both have had sprawling empires. Of course, the more internationally active cable channels also have a far larger proportion of international news. I’m truly amazed, however, at the the small proportion given to it on the various evening news programs I have seen here on TV in Seoul. There is better coverage in the major Korean newspapers, which always have pages reserved for international news (in addition to the front page), but I wonder what readership is like compared to broadcast news. Online reading of news, which is widespread in Korea, of course complicates the issue.

This all does raise an interesting normative question, however. Does the discomfort that wandering nomads like myself feel when we travel places and think we find a relative lack of consciousness about problems elsewhere in the world translate into anything more than a reflection of our own insufficient lack of investment into the interests of a specific community?

I turned on the television just in time to catch the replay of the goal that was scored and created such joy all around me. Australia had just scored a goal against Japan…

I read the article while in a subway station in Seoul. I asked Sayaka what the lyrics for 君が代 were again and she proceeded to sing the song. She did this three times, struggling each time to remember the words, before it suddenly occurred to me that it probably isn’t such a good idea for a Japanese person, in a Korean subway station, to be singing the Japanese national anthem out loud. I stopped her and reminded her that her father had explicitly emailed her before she left for Korea and issued her a very formal and detailed warning on how not to provoke the Koreans by, for example, bringing up sensitive historical and territorial issues. He had neglected to tell her not to sing the Japanese anthem in crowded public places.

As you might expect if you have read any of my previous postings, I’m sympathetic to those who want to resist the reintroduction of flag and anthem rituals in the Japanese schools and find it unfortunate that the government affirmed both officially in a 1999 law. On the other hand, from a tactical standpoint, I really don’t think this fight is worth the effort. I don’t think it is possible in the current global and Japanese climate, to make any progress in a movement to oppose the national anthem and flag—even when it evokes images of a troubled national past.

I understand, however, that for younger students, this is one of the only issues where they may personally get involved. They can feel the exhilaration of refusing to sing an anthem which celebrates the Japanese imperial reign and thus get their first taste of civil disobedience. Though far less controversial than their early predecessors, they can join in a long tradition dating back to that historic moment when the Christian Uchimura Kanzô refused to bow at the reading of the Imperial Rescript on Education.

Instead of disrupting school ceremonies, refusing to show, or remaining silent, I think a humorous parody of the anthem is a wonderful idea. If translating the US anthem into Spanish is enough to get US nationalists all wound up, then a witty parody of the Japanese anthem if students are able to get away with singing it. I can almost see their devious chuckles as they sing it. Unlike the provocative Danish cartoons, which I think were simply a bad idea on pragmatic grounds and not problematic in principle, this is highly unlikely to cause violent riots in, say, Kagoshima.

Then I read the lyrics:

Kiss me, girl, your old one.
Till you’re near, it is years till you’re near.
Sounds of the dead will she know?
She wants all told, now retained, for, cold caves know the moon’s
seeing the mad and dead.

What the…?! Oh no…is it possible that my favorite T-shirt company was commissioned to write the lyrics of the parody?

The Sankei article tries to help us understand how on earth this resembles the anthem enough to go unnoticed:

歌詞は、本来の歌詞と発声が酷似した英語の体裁。例えば冒頭部分は「キス・ミー・ガール・ユア・オールド・ワン」で、「キー（ス）・ミー・ガー（ル）・ヨー・ワー（ン）」と聞こえ、口の動きも本来の歌詞と見分けにくい。

I’m sorry, this is just pathetic. The song does bear some resemblance to the sounds of the original lyrics when you pronounce the English words in their Japanese katakana equivalents, but it is neither humorous nor does it make any sense. This is nowhere near the talented work that lies behind something like Hatten är din (Flash).

I suggest we help these students by giving them something better to work with. Any volunteers to help?

Here are the original Japanese lyrics:

君が代は
千代に八千代に
さざれ石の
いわおとなりて
こけのむすまで

The pronunciation:

きみがよは
ちよにやちよに
さざれいしの
いわおとなりて
こけのむすまで

Romanized:

Kimi ga yo wa
Chiyo ni Yachiyo ni
Sazare ishi no
Iwao to narite
Koke no musu made

Remember, if we make alternate lyrics, our satirical bite will be limited somewhat since we have to make the new version sound as phonetically close as possible to the original. Also, since it will be sung by young Japanese students, we should avoid English sounds that are difficult for Japanese to create. Post your recommendations in the comments! Finally, like the original Japanese attempt we should keep in mind that the Japanese pronunciations of English words aren’t always what you might expect.

I’ll also be joining the Harvard May Day rally and walk out tomorrow which is to show solidarity with the movement. You can read more about the Harvard coalition here.

The basic positions: 1) against criminalization of undocumented immigrants 2) in demand for a real path to citizenship for the millions of undocumented individuals who reside in our country and want to become U.S. citizens 3) in support for civil rights for immigrant workers 4) in favor of equal access to education for immigrants and/or their children.

To find out more general information about these issues, and ways that you can support the movement, visit the Immigrant Solidarity Network.

Pyongyang, April 22 (KCNA) — A spokesman for the Committee for the Peaceful Reunification of the Fatherland issued a statement on Friday to denounce the pro-U.S. ultra-right organizations in south Korea for staging such a ridiculous farce as giving bosses of the U.S. ruling machines in south Korea including the U.S. ambassador Korean names. The south Korea-U.S. “Alliance Friendship Society” in March named U.S. Ambassador in Seoul Vershbow “Pak Po U” in the hope that he would be an eternal friend who regards south-Korea U.S. alliance as a jewel.

The former U.S. 8th army commander in south Korea who finished his service on April 11 was named “Kim Han Su” in the hope that he would always defend “south Korea-U.S. alliance”, the U.S. 7th air force commander “Kim Ung Bi” in the meaning that he is a hero flying in the sky, Laporte, U.S. forces commander in south Korea who went back home in February, “Ra Po Thae” in the hope that he would play a role of a jewel in the south Korea-U.S. alliance.

The statement noted that this disgusting farce cannot be construed otherwise than despicable rowdyism staged by pro-U.S. flunkeyists and mentally deranged guys keen to prolong their dirty remaining days by clinging to the coattails of the aggressors, utterly indifferent to the misfortune the Koreans have undergone. Such traitorous acts to serve the U.S. will bring nothing but a catastrophic war disaster to the Korean nation, the statement notes, warning that south Korea can never be safe nor the Korean nation live in peace as long as pro-U.S. traitorous group such as the GNP and the “friendship society” are at large.

Here are two articles from South Korea on the naming. Seriously, though, I think giving Vershbow a name with “treasure friend” (寶友) isn’t all that strange, but I have to say it does near the realm of the farcical when you give someone the name close to being “protector of Korea” (“korea protect” 韓守). Also, according to the Joongang Daily, General Campbell seems to be under the impression that they named him the protector of Korean freedom: “What a tremendous honor to have the Korean name that means great defender of freedom on the Korean Peninsula.” If you wanted to squeeze the name for all its worth, the most you could get was that he was the protector of Korean gold or metal (金).

When it comes to problems with free speech about Islam, Denmark is something of a hotspot. Islamic radicals murdered Danish film director Theo Van Gogh in 2004 in response to his short film “Submission Part I,” which juxtaposed documentary footage of husbands beating their Islamic wives in the name of Allah and the same women praying, their bodies covered in verses from the Koran. In Islam, any visual portrayal of the prophet is blasphemous and last year, it seemed that the Dutch were too afraid of reprisals from Muslim fundamentalists for author Kåre Bluitgen to find an illustrator for his children’s book about Muhammad. A major Danish newspaper Jyllands-Posten responded by publishing twelve “blasphemous” cartoons last September to “test whether fear of Islamic retribution has begun to limit freedom of expression in Denmark.

I think the author, an undergraduate English concentrator, would be greatly helped if someone were to tell her a few basic, but important facts:

People from Denmark are called “Danish”
Danish ≠ Dutch
Dutch people come from the Netherlands
The Netherlands is not the same country as Denmark

We can then move on to more nit-picky points like:

Theo Van Gogh is Dutch, not Danish
Kåre Bluitgen is Danish, not Dutch

This problem continues through the article, as when we are told that, “it makes no sense for Dutch Muslim protesters to burn the Danish national flag while claiming that they are not being respected by the state.” Also, we learn that, “Dutch illustrators are not the only ones who feel intimidated by Islamic fundamentalists.” Indeed, I hear that some Danish illustrators are having trouble too.

These sorts of mixups are common of course, and admittedly the Dutch and Danish have a lot in common (they both make cheap beer with green labels for example) but I’m a little dissapointed that the editorial staff at the Crimson didn’t notice this.

UPDATE: Since this article I realize that the Dutch-Danish mix up is even more widespread than I imagined. A friend of mine, a certain PhD student friend of mine at Columbia U also mixed the two up. Also, on the most recent Daily Show, when Jon Stewart is mocking the Danish in a skit about attacks on KFC in Pakistan, he threatens the crowd, who were laughing a little too hard, and says something like, “Hey, I’ll throw all you Belgians out!” Why would he mention Belgians when talking about Denmark, unless he though Denmark was the Netherlands?

My host for my ChinaJapan.org site had a crash and had no functional backups. They handled the whole thing with complete incompetence which I will be describing at major hosting forums to warn future customers. I’m going to be moving the site to another host where I am hosting Muninn and FrogInAWell along with numerous other projects. I have fairly recent backups so I think I can get everything back up.

Che and Sponheim

By the time I post this to the internet, the Norwegian Storting elections will be over. However, one amusing thing about the last days of the election campaign. The Left party, or Venstre, was campaigning in downtown Stavanger on Friday, my last day at the library. The Left party is actually one of the non-socialists (Norwegian parties are traditionally but somewhat misleadingly divided into socialist and non-socialist camps) and are in the current (relatively) conservative coalition. However, they had some interesting campaign posters which were appealing to young voters. They depicted that famous image of Che Guevera (sp?), the Communist revolutionary leader on a red background. However, instead of Che’s face, they put Lars Sponheim, the leader of the Venstre party.

This was cute but somewhat surprising given the Høyre (Right party, their coalition ally) party’s recent ineffective attack on the Socialistic Left or SV party by associating them closely with Communist regimes and their atrocities. However, I suspect the irony of the poster escapes the notice of most.

And yet imagine if you will, the same campaign poster, approved by the party in the United States. While the Left party in Norway is a very moderate centrist party in comparison to the Republicans, imagine if you will some moderate republican putting their face on a Che poster in a effort to appeal to young voters. It just wouldn’t happen, right?

Norwegian Television Debate

VG, one of the major Norwegian newspapers (although it has always looked like a tabloid to me) has a strange way of measuring up the political debate between the party leaders in its Sunday, Sept. 11th issue. It first give all the participants of the debates a grade from 1 to 6 (six being best). It gave a 5 to Jens Stoltenberg (Labor party) and Dagfinn Høybråten (Christian Democrats) and 4s to everyone else except the right-wing Progress party (3 points) and the marginal Coast Party (2 points). Then it marked each one along a scale showing whether they were on the offense or defense in the debate. The highest “offense” ratings went to the hard left-wing Red Alliance, Socialist Left and Labor party, basically the left spectrum of Norwegian politics. Then, most bizarrely, it marked the mood of each participant with happy and sad faces on a scale. The most happy were apparently the Center party and Progress Party, with the most miserable being the Right party (who are set to lose big in this election) and the Coast party.

Critique of Domination

Roger Cohen had a good editorial in the Sept. 10-11 Int. Herald Tribune I got in the airport today where he discusses the political split on discussing looting during a crisis like the Katrina hurricane. He notes that conservatives are taking a hard line “zero tolerance” for looting (even those stealing food and water) but notes sardonically that Rumsfeld once said “While no one can condone looting, on the other hand, one can understand the pent-up feelings that may result from decades of oppression.” Of course, he was referring to Iraq, which led Cohen to say that Rumsfeld and conservatives think that “A little mayhem in Mesopotamia was just fine” as long as it wasn’t within the US.

However, I found most memorable a quote from a French philosopher Alain Finkielkraut in the article. He was deeply critical of any sympathy towards looters, who he described as having a “revolting reaction.” Now, I strongly disagree with his take on the looting question and find myself having no moral opposition to any looting for food and essentials in a crisis situation. However, he then added a quote which sums up one of my biggest problems with recent critical theory.

While I’m very much influenced by a lot of recent critical theory out there, especially those important in historical research, I’m worried about the kind of moral paralysis I feel can result from some approaches suggested by things like postcolonial theory and postmodern critiques of society. Finkielkraut sums this up very nicely into one line, “It’s funny, our dominant ideology is a critique of domination in all its forms.”

The two pieces of rock inconveniently dare to emerge from the water somewhere north of the red arrow (see the string of black shadow like blobs, probably one of those, but not enough land to show up in this Google satellite photo, please don’t try to explain exactly which one it is in the comments – I really couldn’t care less, another map here) To be honest, I’m so sick of the whole thing: I have reached Dokto saturation level and this posting will be my first and last on the topic…

Like so many other such mind-bogglingly stupid issues, people can do very silly things when they suddenly come to believe that they might potentially “lose” ownership or claim to a hunk of rock. Wonky Japanese nationalists drive around in black buses and damage their throats yelling about it while the generally apathetic Japanese public around them try to remember exactly where those islands were again. North of Hokkaido? Oh no, they were those other islands we are trying to get back from Russia. South of Kyushu somewhere? Oh no, those are those other islands that were in the news last week when we got into a fight with some Taiwanese about it.

Oh ya, these were those islands that some prefectural government decided, bizarrely, to issue commemorative stamps for, even though there is practically a Korean military mini-base squeezed onto one of the rocks.

Then in Korea of course, some slightly emotional types have been known to cut off their finger or immolate themselves. School children have been commissioned to produce Dokto artwork full of expressions of love and friendship for their Japanese neighbors. I generally don’t recommend bringing up the topic in conversation. Then again, you might want to hear the Dokto song taught to children in school. To put it mildly, apathy is not widespread here when it comes to these pieces of rock.

Dokto is absolutely everywhere in daily life here. I will just share a few examples:

Here is a picture of Craig and I wearing our Dokto T-Shirts. Ever since I have arrived, colorful Dokto T-Shirts with the phrase, “Dokto is our territory” have been on sale by a vender outside Pizza Hut here at Seoul National University subway station for the nice and cheap price of about $5. Craig is wearing a different T-Shirt, which below a drawing of the rocks says in English, “I Love Dokto” Perhaps most amusingly, I have seen this T-Shirt can be found in convenience stores in many places in the underwear section. If you are shopping yourself for a T-Shirt, I recommend mine, since it is of a thicker material and thus less resembles underwear.

On a recent trip to Insadong we passed by a street side Dokto information table where you can get brochures and information about the island dispute and learn more about how you can help save these two rocks from Japanese aggression. I have seen several such information tables and information boards around Seoul, and they are often staffed by young and very energetic looking supporters.

The other day I went to a restaurant around the corner from my dormitory and found the wall painted with charming landscapes of the Korean coastline. On one whole wall of the restaurant, sure enough, there was a painting of the two rocks, with the phrase, “Dokto is our territory” written next to it.

Then of course, there is the fact that everywhere you go, you are bombarded with signs claiming the rocks and often less than friendly things about Japan. On the walk I make to school every morning I pass by an elementary school which is decorated by these two banners, for example:

Finally, and this is my favorite. These two tiny rocks that barely make it out of the water actually get their own weather report. Yes, that is right, while watching a TV weather report recently here in Korea, I noticed that, in addition to Seoul, Busan, Cheju island, and other major regional and population centers, the audience can be relieved to learn whether it is raining, cloudy, or nothing but sunshine beaming above those sacred islands in the middle of the sea.

There is nothing unusual about these sorts of irredentist island issues becoming important political issues. Japan has its share, and China and Southeast Asia have many as well. Europe is no exception and Canadian children learn about that dreadful British betrayal when the US took a chunk of Alaska. However, simply no one, no one can hold a candle to the degree of saturation that Korean society has reached with regards to these two hunks of rock, especially amazing considering that Korea already occupy the damn things.

Here are some examples of the advice he has been getting from more experienced soldiers he has come across:

You can’t tell which Iraqis are going to try to kill you, so you should act on any doubt or suspicion you have by cutting down anyone who makes you nervous. Act on hunches; pull the trigger. It may turn out to be the wrong choice, but it’s a wrong choice that you’ll live through.

An NCO explained to a class that the ragheads won’t understand what you tell them, and you won’t understand that little gobbledy-gook that they talk, so the best way to get them on the ground to search them is to kick ‘em in the balls or butt-stroke ‘em in the face. That they’ll understand.

While there are important and highly relevant differences in the scale of violence, I have read very similar statements to these being made by Japanese soldiers in occupied China, German occupation soldiers in wartime Europe, and in the example most relevant for Americans, of course, made by troops in Vietnam. Again, highly important differences in scale and thankfully there are other forms of violence (rape, large massacres) which are far less prevalent in this conflict, but it is important to remember that an occupied people will come into contact with this day-to-day level of violence and racism by the troops in their midsts, and depending on a number of factors, it can produce powerful and long-lasting memories.

He apparently believes (link in Japanese) that “gender neutral [lit. gender free] education and extreme sex education are running rampant. There are those who might say that this is wrecking Japan.” His comments apparently continued to critique Japan’s gender neutral education system.

Sayaka points out that this is one of many similar comments by the minister and laments the fact that no one seems to have gotten across the message to the Japanese minister the importance of the foundations of an education system.

She also talks about the bewildering “return to Confucian values” movement in Japan. There is a movement to change or get rid of article 24 of the Japanese constitution which states that:

Marriage shall be based only on the mutual consent of both sexes and it shall be maintained through mutual cooperation with the equal rights of husband and wife as a basis. 2) With regard to choice of spouse, property rights, inheritance, choice of domicile, divorce and other matters pertaining to marriage and the family, laws shall be enacted from the standpoint of individual dignity and the essential equality of the sexes.

Opposition to this comes in the form of those who argue that, “Japan has gone too far in promoting individual rights and should return to the duties of family, community and nation.” Fortunately, however, there is a counter campaign against an effort to alter the clause.

UPDATE: Jae over at Tianan saw Sayaka’s posting and decided to look up the related clause in the Korean constitution. Read more on his blog.

In a separate brilliantly stupid move, Koizumi cited Confucius in defence of his Yasukuni shrine visits which include the Class-A war criminals, “Condemn the offense, but pity the offender.”

The staff of the English-language edition of Chosun.com wish to apologize to readers who may have been offended by a May 2 article on this website headlined “U.S.: North Korea Apparently Fires Missile into Sea of Japan”. We would like to explain that the article was not a Chosun.com article, but rather one provided to us by the Voice of America (VOA), one of our partner organizations.

Due to our agreement with VOA, we do not change either the content or the headline of articles it provides. We recognize, however, that using an article that employs the term “Sea of Japan” may be offensive to some readers, especially considering the sensitive state of relations between Korea and Japan. For this, we sincerely apologize, and the article in question has been erased.

I am not doing full translations of this so it is better to read the Japanese if you can, but for everyone’s benefit I quickly made some half-translations that often change the original wording and skips some material:

April 14th

日本の動きを牽制（けんせい）するための政治カードとして、歴史問題と反日デモを利用していることは明らかだ。…これは明白な国際法違反だ。「外交関係に関するウィーン条約」２２条では、侵入や損壊からの大使館の保護、大使館の「安寧の妨害」や「威厳の侵害」の防止に、その国は「適切なすべての措置を執る特別の責務」を負う。

English Summary (not full translation): It is clear that the Chinese are using the history problem and protests as a “history card” to constrain Japan… [the attack on the consulate] is a violation of international law.

April 17th

中国政府は「デモは、歴史問題での日本の誤った態度に不満を持つ市民の自発的な行動だ。責任は中国側にない」との主張を繰り返している。こうした無責任な態度が、デモの暴徒化を助長している。…江沢民前政権以降、中国政府は徹底した愛国「反日」教育を行ってきた。いわば自業自得ではないか。町村外相は１７日に訪中し、日中外相会談を行う。外相は、謝罪と補償を改めて迫るだけでなく、反日感情の政治利用ともとれる中国政府の姿勢を直接ただし、是正を求めるべきだ。

Summary: The Chinese claim the protests are a spontaneous reaction to Japan’s attitude to the history question and isn’t their fault. This is an irresponsible attitude and only contributing to the protests. China has supported nationalist policies in China since Jiang Zemin’s regime. Isn’t this a case of “you reap what you sow?” Not only should Japan ask for and apology and compensation but we should confront China about its political use of anti-Japanese sentiment.

April 18th

李肇星外相から、謝罪はなく、「歴史問題が中国人民の感情を傷つけている」と、事実上、デモを容認した。…　「歴史」認識の問題について、中国側は小泉首相の靖国神社参拝、歴史教科書などを問題視した。だが、いずれも、日本の内政問題である。…日本の歴史教科書は、中国のような国定教科書ではない。一党独裁の全体主義国家のように、歴史観、思想・信条の統一や、検閲はできない。…考えるべきは、歴史的事実としては疑問のある内容も多い「反日」愛国教育の問題ではないか。

Summary: The Chinese haven’t apologized but have essentially consented to the protests. They complain about Yasukuni and the textbook incident but in both cases this is a domestic issue. Japan’s textbooks are not government issued textbooks like China’s. We can’t censor them in the way a totalitarian dictatorship does. Shouldn’t we be focusing our attention on the anti-Japanese nationalist education in China with its historically dubious content?

Compare them to some selections from the Asahi (on average longer) editorials related to the protests:

April 12th

アジア、とりわけ中国との関係は、日本の外交にとって最重要の柱のひとつとなってきた。侵略戦争の過去をどう清算するかというだけではない。体制の違いを超えて隣の大国と安定した関係を築くことは、将来の日本の安全と繁栄のために欠かせないという判断があったからにほかならない。…９０年代に強調された愛国教育が、若者たちの心に反日意識を植えつけた面も否めない。そうした点は、中国にも十分考えてもらわなければならない。わけても暴力の取り締まりについて、中国に強く注文をつけるのは当然である。　しかし、日本政府はそうした中国の問題点を見据えたうえで、効果的な外交をしてきただろうか。残念ながら逆だったと言わざるを得ない。その根底にあるのが小泉首相の靖国神社参拝だ。首相は「戦没者に追悼の誠をささげ、不戦を誓う」と説明する。だが、中国侵略の責めを負うＡ級戦犯を合祀（ごうし）した靖国神社である。参拝をやめてほしい、という中国側のたび重なる要請を聞き入れず、なお参拝に意欲を見せるという姿勢が、どれほど中国の人々の気持ちを逆なでし、「過去を反省しない日本」という印象を広げてきたか。…首相はことあるごとに「世界の中の日米同盟」を強調する。だが、アジアでの足元が定まらないままでは、結局、米国の力にすがるだけの国になってしまいかねない。

Summary: Japan’s foreign relations with China and Asia are very important. It isn’t just about dealing with the aggressive war of the past. Creating a stable relationship with our strong neighbors is important to the stability and prosperity of Japan. We can’t deny that the nationalistic education has increased the anti-Japanese sentiment amongst the young and we need to get China to realize this. Of course we need to complain to the Chinese about the violence but has the Japanese government really done effective diplomacy for dealing with this? No, on the contrary, we have things like Koizumi’s trips to Yasukuni. It is the same Yasukuni which has A-Level war criminal enshrined in it and we continually ignore the wishes of China and thus spread the idea that we are a Japan which doesn’t regret its past. The prime minister has emphasizeded a “US-Japan alliance situated in [the global environment] but as long as we don’t take care of our relations with Asia, we are ultimately forced to be a nation that clings to America.

April 13th

中国の報道　事実を伝えてほしい …われわれはデモの激しさに驚き、投石を制止しなかった当局の姿勢に怒りを感じている。日本政府の抗議に対し、非を認めようとしない中国外務省の態度には失望している。　同時に日本のメディアは、なぜこんなことが起きたのかをさまざまに分析し、歴史問題に対する真剣な対応を小泉首相に求めたりもしている。　ところが、当局によって報道が統制される中国の多くの人々には、それも知らされない。知っているのは、事件の直前まで中国のメディアが繰り返し報じた大量の日本批判だけではないか。…愛国教育などによって、多くの中国人は侵略当時の日本軍の写真や映像を繰り返し見ている。その半面、武力による紛争解決を禁じた憲法を持ち、核兵器は持たず、戦争に加わることのなかった日本の戦後史はほとんど知らされていない。靖国神社や一部の歴史教科書の問題ばかりが強調される現代日本への認識には、相当な偏りがあるのではないか。…今回の事件とともに、日本社会の多様性をありのままに知ってほしい。このメッセージが中国の多くの人々に届くよう願うばかりだ。

Summary: We want the Chinese Media to tell the truth. We are surprised at the aggresive nature of the protests and the rock throwing….the Japanese media has analyzed its causes and urged Koizumi to address the history problem. However, most of the Chinese people are simply unaware of our efforts. All they hear is the Chinese media’s repeated criticism of Japan…Because of their nationalist education most Chinese know see plenty of pictures of the Japanese military from the period of the war of aggression. And yet, they know nothing of the Japan in the postwar period which has adopted a peace constitution, abandoned violence, and which has no nuclear weapons. Isn’t it true that China’s perception of Japan is overly biased towards consideration of the Yasukuni and history textbooks issue? We want China to give its people the message that Japan is in fact a very diverse society.

April 16th

日中会談　まず投石事件に決着を…厳しいやりとりは避けられそうにないが、まず中国側が投石事件への責任を明確に認めることが会談を進める前提になる。一国の大使館が夕刻から深夜まで被害にさらされていながら、警官隊は制止しなかった。それにもかかわらず、中国外務省が「責任は中国側にない」としていることに日本国民は憤っている。…日中間において歴史問題が重要であることは私たちも訴えてきた。だが、たとえ反日デモの背景に歴史問題があったとしても、大使館が被害にあうのを黙認した責任は免れない。

Summary: We must engage in negotiations on the premise that China takes responsibility for the rock throwing incident….The police did not stop them. Not only that but the Chinese government claims they have no responsibility to take in this issue and have further angered the Japanese people. We have also admitted that the history problem is important for the Japanese to consider but even if that is the cause of the protests, they must accept responsibility for the damage to the consulate.

April 18th (This link will not be right after tomorrow)

　日中会談　「愛国無罪」の危うさ…中国側は、反日デモが度重なる破壊行為に及び、日本人のけが人さえ出ていることを軽く考えすぎていないか。…一連のデモで、参加者たちは「愛国無罪」と叫んでいる。愛国主義の行動に罪はない、という意味だ。そう叫べば、政府が手を緩めることをデモ参加者たちは知っている。共産党や政府自身が「愛国」を宣伝してきたからだ。

Summary: The danger of “Patriotism is Innocent”…Hasn’t the Chinese side taken the damage and injury to the Japanese too lightly? The protesters all yell that “Patriotism is innocent” Actions taken in the name of the nation are not crimes. The protesters know that if the cry this out the government will loosen its grip. This is because the Communist party and the government have themselves made the cry for “Patriotism”

It is obvious to see Asahi’s efforts to maintain a balance and some sympathy with China’s calls for Japan to confront its history better. But I also detect and increasing frustration in their editorials and articles as they turn their focus increasingly to the China side.

Of course, that can’t explain every purchase. A growing number of young and confident Japanese who want their country to become “normal” by revising its “Peace Constitution,” who want to wave their flag with pride, sing their national anthem, and urge the world to accept Japan’s place on a reformed Security Council as one of the great powers — this growingly nationalistic constituency are timed perfectly to be extra sensitive to any criticism from the outside and extra willing to believe those who they feel are are trying to expel the barbarians (攘夷) from Japan’s historiography. Nationalistic revisionists everywhere are scoring points with the terms like “masochistic history.” They urge everyone to stop “hurting our country” by raising children like their parents were raised – trained to accept Japan as a subservient partner in the US-Japan alliance, a chastised, despised, and ultimately aberrant child who, after running amok in Asia on a mission of liberation, had to go back to the school of civilization and enlightenment under the guiding rule of American hegemony.

This message finds an attentive ear, even amongst those who hereto couldn’t care less about how many people died in the slaughter at Nanjing, how many comfort women were coerced or deceived, and who would be perfectly willing to accept the judgment of historians. Now, however, there is the growing realization that history is deeply political and that history has real consequences. The left-leaning and Marxist scholars who dominated the Japanese academic establishment in the postwar period and well into the 1980s never lost sight of that fact, but in their deeply empirical and positivist approaches, they failed to pass on this lesson to the new generation of historians and most of all – the average guy on the street.

It has always been the left who has best mobilized history throughout the modern world. Nationalism, which we all now associate with the right, in its earliest forms was dominated by the forces of the left. Indeed it was the left – forces who wanted to form national communities, albeit imagined, in which the citizens with rights were the fundamental unit of the nation and not the aristocratic elites with their foreign tongues and traditions. Communism and socialist activists who occasionally (certainly less often than we are led to believe) transcended the national in their visions of the future have through the ages always seen the control of history as key and Marxist thought brought Hegelian teology to new heights with its relentless progressivism.

Thus, it shouldn’t be surprising that the revisionist movement in Japan is full of former-Marxists who have undergone a kind of tenkô, or conversion, to the far right. Their nationalism was born in the fires of the anti-US protests of the 1960s. International socialism could no longer serve their needs, and they returned to the warm bosom of cultural essentialism and national myth. To this, however, they brought the very weapon that Communism wielded so jealously: history.

In this respect, this generation of revisionists are very similar to those in the pre-war. Almost all of the leading intellectuals and ideologues of Japan’s pre-war empire who wrote the classic texts describing Japan’s unique mission in the world (that are still deeply popular amongst the right-wing in Japan today) dabbled in Marxism or were deeply influenced by it. Anyone reading Watsuji Tetsurô’s classic crypto-nationalist Fûdô (The title is often translated as “Climate and Culture”) is struck by the preface in which he admits to revising the text in order to expunge the old Marxist terminology that he once was poisoned with. Miki Kiyoshi, who is one of the great architects of Japan’s vision for a liberated Asia, also started out deeply interested in Marxism, though he came to reject class struggle. Despite his fascist philosophy, he actually rejected a “narrow Japanism” and believed Japan was ironically superior because of its “world spirit.” The list goes on and on. It should be a healthy reminder to progressives like myself, however, that the ideological roots of fascism in Japan, as is the case elsewhere, are deeply connected with left-leaning philosophies.

What is important in this case, however, is the fact that the mainstream historical scholarship of Japan, if not the majority of the academy in Japan as far as I can tell, has become so completely enchanted with a positivist or “apolitical” approach to their scholarship that they have forgotten lessons already learned. There is NO such thing as apolitical history, NO such thing as doing a history of “just the facts” and completely impossible to exempt oneself from the present when we look at the past. This is why in 2001 the mainstream historians, who I believe are still left-leaning and non-revisionist (now this term “revisionism” reveals its uncomfortable hypocrisy) with respect to Japan’s imperialism and wartime activities, were almost completely paralyzed when faced with the new textbook. Despite its low adoption rate, it dominated the discourse on history in the media and government. Suddenly, hundreds of academics who laughed at its comically nationalistic narrative and who believed they could just ignore it and thus rob it of legitimacy were being propelled into the media light and expected to wage a battle they had no interest in fighting.

When they did, the results were deeply unsatisfying to everyone. They quibbled over numbers, wavered in their justification for including and excluding events, and some found themselves forced to admit that there were in fact few “factual” errors in the text that were quite worth the fuss. When the nationalists demanded that we “tell a history to make our children proud of Japan” they could hardly argue since this is clearly the position of the Ministry of Education. Surely they could not attack the ministry for having such a policy because it is the fundamental principle justifying the teaching of national history all over the world. National history contributes to identify formation, to a sympathy for national principles and national goals, and it necessarily privileges the self over the portrayals of the other. The government-approved list of events which must be included in all textbooks are those chosen to narrate the progress of the nation towards its powerful and modern form. This poses little or no problem to the radical revisionists, but it severely restricts the ability of historians to write textbooks where the subject of the sentence isn’t “Japan.” Class, ethnicity, gender, regional or municipal units of identification, colonial subjects, victims of invasion, the list goes on – these can only find their way into the narrative through the careful negotiation with and subordination to the story of “Japan” as an abstract and mobile target which is propelled towards greatness in the present.

It is certainly possible to tell a national history which condemns the nation. My high school American history course was of this kind (how we treated the blacks, how we treated the native americans, how we treated the Vietnamese, and how we treated the world were four major sections of my class). However, such critical approaches are almost helpless in the face of criticism that they are inconsistent with “teaching our children to love our country.” They survive only as an undercurrent of (usually left-leaning) resistance to the overwhelmingly dominant trend supporting national history. Because the nation remains unproblematized as the unit of study, these approaches remain trapped by it.

So what to do? Well, the first step lies not in greater regulation and government control over historical narratives, but in severing the connection between the state (who today is the institutional embodiment of the nation in most places) and history education. This step accomplishes two things in the case of Japan: 1) It makes it impossible to blame “Japan” for “issuing” or “approving” or “allowing” textbooks. The Japanese government’s currently dubious claims to be “neutral” will be, if not more plausible, at least defensible. 2) It permits post-national (transnational or simply a-national) historical approaches the freedom to develop and compete. Without a doubt, the latter approaches will be met in the short term with resounding failures in the textbook market, especially below the college level, where community involvement in the textbook selection process precludes adequate consideration for these more complicated and nuanced narratives. We know this already from such efforts elsewhere. Nationalism doesn’t disappear overnight – but neither did it appear overnight. In the short 100-300 years in the history of the “nation” as a primary unit of identification and loyalty, it has faced great challenges. Its demise, to which I dedicate my life’s scholarship, can only be expected to require a similar amount of time.

In the short term thus, things do not bode well for the reform of textbooks domestically in Japan. On the contrary, the current crisis has led to a spiraling “feedback loop” in which an apathetic and uninterested Japanese mainstream public has become quickly politicized with respect to this issue. The textbook in question generated massive anti-Japanese sentiment which has gone well and far beyond a critique of “the Japanese government” or “the rightists” or “the LDP” or “that textbook” and has transformed (at least as seen by all the major media reports in Japan) into a battle between the Chinese and “Japanese pigs” or “Japanese devils.” In doing so the protest leaders, who are very often the brilliant students at China’s leading universities (Beida, Qinghua, Renmin, Fudan, etc.) foolishly fail to realize that they have strong allies in Japan, especially among intellectuals, the teacher’s unions, the left, and even the apathetic public who are vaguely sorry about the evils of the past. Increasingly, however, this development has led to a shift in Japan. As a result, the growingly loud voice of conservative nationalists and the potential for the radical textbook to pick up as much as a tenth of the schools in Japan could be behind the fact that the other seven textbooks may have (who has actually seen the as-yet un-adopted 2005 textbooks anyways!!) all shifted somewhat toward the “center” or “right” in their portrayals of the war (if, for example, it is true that they all drop references to comfort women that they included before). I have seen some of the earlier editions (2002) of these textbooks in the National Children’s library in Tokyo and in some cases they had great sidebars on colonial rule and wartime atrocities. It is these textbooks that will be the one of the greatest casualties of this crisis.

More importantly, it is plainly obvious that this crisis in China has led to a growingly hostile media scene in Japan. The leading right-leaning Yomiuri has had scathingly anti-China editorials of late and rarely allows for balance. The once dominant left-leaning Asahi simply cannot maintain its traditionally pro-China leanings during the current protests and you find more and more frustration in their editorials and articles towards a China which fails to appreciate the diversity of opinions and historical views within Japan, the true nature of its textbook approval process, or the albeit mixed history of its “apology diplomacy” in the past.

My optimistic professors and advisor in Japan were only a year or two ago rejoicing that even Chinese intellectuals had begun to utter the once taboo phrase “East Asian community” and my department triumphantly won Ministry of Education support for a research institute whose very mission is dedicated to fostering an “East Asian identity” based on equality and cooperation. Professors there claimed that the history problem that has so plagued efforts by rational-choice political scientists to create pretty models of state-to-state relations in the region was finally beginning to subside. Instead we see the powerful “irrational” behavior on the mass level in response to these issues, whether it is in South Korea over the Dokto island issue, the Sino-Korean dispute over Koryô, or the anti-Japanese protests. Whatever government involvement there is in all three cases, it is simply a fiction that the governments are in full control. Even in China, the government must react and adapt to the public, if only to remain marginally in control. If they cannot stop the rock throwing at a consulate, they can at least ration out the rocks.

The online news and weblog coverage of this has been intense, but alas, with some important exceptions, I have seen plenty of the same polarization of opinions online as we find amongst the frustrated Chinese and Japanese. I urge all of us to take this opportunity to explore the contradictions of national history itself, rather than fling accusations of hypocrisy at the Chinese or barrages of hateful insult at the growing historical revisionism in Japan.